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MAKING AN “IDEA” A REALITY:  PROVIDING 
A FREE AND APPROPRIATE PUBLIC 
EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN WITH 
DISABILITIES UNDER THE INDIVIDUALS 
WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Robert, a middle school student, was diagnosed with Autism 
Spectrum Disorder, a complex neurological disorder that affects the 
functioning of the brain and impacts development in the areas of social 
interaction and communication skills.1  As a result of his disability, 
Robert often engages in unique behaviors, including self-injurious 
conduct, head-banging, hand-flapping, and random vocalization, that 
interfere with his ability to grasp and learn basic concepts in the learning 
environment.  An academic and psychological evaluation determined 
that, with the proper supplementary services and instruction, Robert 
would be able to benefit educationally from the instruction. 
Before the school year began, Robert’s parents, teachers, and school 
psychologist crafted an individualized education plan (“IEP”) designed 
to meet his unique educational needs.  Among the services listed in 
Robert’s IEP were that an autism specialist visit the school twice per 
week to provide augmentative communication services and that Robert’s 
general education teacher receive state autism training. 
A few weeks into the school year, Robert’s parents learned that the 
school never implemented the services enumerated in their child’s IEP.  
As a result, Robert further regressed to abnormal behaviors, lost attained 
language, and withdrew from others.  Consequently, Robert’s parents 
sued the school district for failing to implement Robert’s IEP in violation 
of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). 
This example sets the stage for a highly contested issue among the 
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals:  whether a school district’s 
failure to implement certain provisions of a student’s IEP violates the 
IDEA.  The IDEA ensures that all handicapped children receive a free 
appropriate public education (“FAPE”).2  The reach of this mandate, 
however, is far from clear.3  As a result, the circuit courts have developed 
                                                 
1 This hypothetical scenario was created by the author to illustrate the impact of a 
school district’s failure to implement the provisions of a student’s individualized education 
plan. 
2 See infra Part II.B (discussing the protections provided to children with disabilities 
under the IDEA). 
3 See infra notes 45–46 and accompanying text (stating that Congress did not explicitly 
clarify what constitutes an adequate FAPE for students with disabilities). 
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varying interpretations and standards for evaluating failure to 
implement cases.4  This disparity in interpretations has led to different 
results for similarly situated disabled students across the United States.5  
Thus, to promote consistency and to fully accomplish the goal of 
educating students with disabilities, the IDEA should mandate that 
school districts strictly adhere to all provisions of a student’s IEP.6 
First, Part II of this Note discusses the history of the IDEA and the 
different standards used to evaluate IEP implementation failures.7  
Second, Part III analyzes the problems with the standards adopted by the 
Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits.8  Finally, Part IV proposes two 
alternatives to resolving the current inconsistencies surrounding the 
evaluation of IEP implementation failures.9 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Before discussing the various problems and standards associated 
with IEP implementation failures, it is important to understand the 
context of the IDEA’s enactment.10  Part II.A provides the historical and 
legal background of the education of students with disabilities.11  Part 
II.B discusses the enactment of the IDEA as well as the specific 
requirements mandated in the IDEA.12  Part II.C considers the Supreme 
Court’s interpretations of the IDEA.13  Finally, Part II.D sets forth the 
current debate among the circuits regarding whether a school district’s 
                                                 
4 See infra Part II.D (discussing the different standards developed by the circuit courts to 
evaluate a school district’s failure to implement a student’s IEP). 
5 See infra Part III (discussing how the various standards used by the circuit courts have 
led to different results for similarly situated disabled students across the nation). 
6 See infra Part IV (recommending that courts adopt a strict compliance standard for 
evaluating IEP implementation failures). 
7 See infra Part II (discussing the history of educating children with disabilities, the 
enactment of the IDEA, the Supreme Court’s involvement in interpreting the IDEA, and the 
different standards adopted by the circuit courts to evaluate IEP implementation failures). 
8 See infra Part III (comparing and evaluating the different standards used by the circuit 
courts). 
9 See infra Part IV (proposing that strict compliance be added to the definition of FAPE 
in the IDEA or that courts adopt a uniform standard requiring strict compliance with an 
IEP). 
10 See infra Part II.A (discussing the history of educating students with severe mental and 
physical disabilities). 
11 See infra Part II.A (discussing the history of educating students with disabilities). 
12 See infra Part II.B (discussing the federal laws protecting students with disabilities 
including the subsequent reauthorizations of the IDEA). 
13 See infra Part II.C (discussing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of FAPE under the 
IDEA). 
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failure to implement certain provisions of a student’s IEP violates the 
student’s right to the FAPE guaranteed under the IDEA.14 
A. Educating Students with Disabilities 
Throughout history, children with severe mental and physical 
disabilities have experienced isolation from society and from educational 
opportunities.15  They were generally consigned to the care of their 
families or forced to attend separate institutions where they were 
provided little formal education.16  In the landmark decision of Brown v. 
Board of Education, the Supreme Court of the United States determined 
that all children must be afforded an equal educational opportunity.17  
While the Court was primarily addressing the inequality of racially 
segregated public schools, the Brown decision provided the foundation 
                                                 
14 See infra Part II.D (discussing the Fifth, Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits’ approaches 
to evaluating IEP implementation failures). 
15 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006) (“[T]he educational needs of millions of children with 
disabilities were not being fully met because . . . the children were excluded entirely from 
the public school system and from being educated with their peers . . . .”); Dep’t of Pub. 
Welfare v. Haas, 154 N.E.2d 265, 270 (Ill. 1958) (holding that Illinois’ compulsory education 
statute did not mandate the free public education of the “feeble minded or mentally 
deficient children” who could not benefit from education); see also Emily Rosenblum, 
Interpreting the 1997 Amendment to the IDEA:  Did Congress Intend to Limit the Remedy of 
Private School Tuition Reimbursement for Disabled Children?, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2733, 2733 
(2009) (stating that “‘weak minded,’ ‘difficult to educate,’ and ‘moron of a very low 
type . . . who is incapable of absorbing knowledge’” are merely a few of the rationales 
proferred by states “attempting to exclude disabled children from public school[ systems] 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century”). 
16 See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF 
INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 18 (1983) (“Fear, shame and lack of understanding led some families 
to hide or disown their handicapped members or allow them to die.”).  The first 
documented attempt to educate special needs students occurred in 1555, when the Spanish 
monk Pedro Ponce de Leon taught a small group of deaf students to read, write, speak, and 
to master the basic academic subjects.  Robert L. Hughes & Michael A. Rebell, Special 
Educational Inclusion and the Courts:  A Proposal for a New Remedial Approach, 25 J.L. & EDUC. 
523, 527−28 (1996).  In the United States, the first American Asylum for the Education of the 
Deaf and Dumb was established in Hartford, Connecticut by Thomas Hopkins Gallaudet.  
Id. at 528.  Children with disabilities were typically dismissed as having discipline 
problems; thus, some states created special schools to address the needs of students with 
discipline problems.  Id.  For example, New Haven formed a class for misbehaved students 
in 1871; New York created a class for “unruly boys” in 1871; and Cleveland established a 
class for students with discipline problems in the late 1870’s.  Id.  In 1896, Rhode Island 
established the first special classes for the mentally retarded in its public schools.  
Furthermore, by 1911, a survey published by the United States Bureau of Education found 
that 99 of 1285 schools had classes for the “mentally defective,” and 220 had classes for 
“backward child[ren].”  Id. at 528−29 (alteration in original). 
17 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that the segregation of school children violated the 
guarantees of equal protection and due process in the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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for parents of children with mental and physical disabilities to challenge 
school districts regarding the segregation of disabled children.18 
Challenges to the educational inequalities of disabled children first 
arose in the early 1970s in Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. 
Pennsylvania (“PARC”) and Mills v. Board of Education.19  In PARC, a 
Pennsylvania federal court found that several Pennsylvania statutes 
unconstitutionally discriminated against mentally retarded children.20  
Although the parties settled their dispute outside of court, the judge 
endorsed a consent decree providing that Pennsylvania had an 
obligation to publicly educate mentally retarded children in a program 
appropriate for that individual child’s capacity.21 
                                                 
18 Id. at 483.  “[I]t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in 
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.  Such an opportunity, where the state 
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal 
terms.”  Id. at 493; see also Cory L. Shindel, Note, One Standard Fits All?  Defining 
Achievement Standards for Students with Cognitive Disabilities Within the No Child Left Behind 
Act’s Standardized Framework, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 1025, 1034 (2004) (explaining that following 
Brown v. Board of Education, which held that racial segregation of public schools violated the 
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, parents of students with disabilities and disability interest groups began 
modeling their claims after the equal protection arguments asserted in Brown). 
19 See Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded 
Children v. Pennsylvania (PA Ass’n I), 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971); see also Shima 
Kalaei, Students with Autism Left Behind:  No Child Left Behind and the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 723, 727 (2008) (discussing that PARC and 
Mills were the first two federal district court cases to address the issue of educational 
inequality in segregated facilities for disabled children and both courts ruled in favor of 
providing students with disabilities access to public education). 
20 Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania (PA Ass’n II), 343 F. Supp. 279, 283 
(E.D. Pa. 1972).  The exclusions of retarded children complained of are based upon four 
state statutes which permitted the State Board of Education to do the following:  (1) 
disallow the education of a child who was deemed “uneducable and untrainable” by a 
school psychologist; (2) indefinitely postpone the admission to public school of any child 
who had not attained a “mental age” of five years; (3) exempt from compulsory attendance 
laws a child whom a psychologist finds unable to profit from a public education; and (4) 
use the definition of compulsory school age (eight to seventeen years) to postpone 
admissions of retarded children until age eight or to eliminate them from public schools at 
the age of seventeen.  Id. at 282–84.  The plaintiffs alleged that the Pennsylvania schools 
denied these students due process of law because the statutes did not provide for notice 
and a hearing before the students were placed in special education programs or they 
denied the students the right to education all together.  Id. at 283.  The plaintiff further 
alleged that the provisions violated the equal protection clause because the statutes 
assumed that certain students were uneducable and untrainable, which lacked a rational 
basis in fact.  Id.  Pennsylvania established a Stipulation and Consent Agreement in which 
the state agreed to provide due process to students with disabilities and access to a free 
public program of education and training appropriate to his learning capacities to all 
individuals between the ages of six and twenty-one.  Id. at 302–03. 
21 Pa. Ass’n I, 334 F. Supp. at 1260 (providing the language of the initial consent decree).  
The amended consent decree provided the following: 
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Similarly, Mills v. Board of Education further expanded the right of 
students with disabilities to a public education.22  In Mills, the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia held that a school 
district’s practice of expelling, reassigning, and transferring students 
labeled as learning disabled, emotionally disturbed, or mentally 
retarded, denied the students a free public appropriate education in 
violation of the due process clause.23  Due process of law required a 
hearing before children were suspended or expelled from regular 
schooling in publicly supported schools or reassigned for specialized 
instruction.24  In ordering the District of Columbia to provide the 
                                                                                                             
 It is the Commonwealth’s obligation to place each mentally retarded 
child in a free, public program of education and training appropriate 
to the child’s capacity, within the context of the general educational 
policy that, among the alternative programs of education and training 
required by statute to be available, placement in a regular public 
school class is preferable to placement in a special public school class 
and placement in a special public school class is preferable to 
placement in any other type of program of education and training. 
Pa. Ass’n II, 343 F. Supp. at 307. 
22 Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 875 (holding that the school district’s failure to provide disabled 
students with a publicly supported specialized education violated the due process clause). 
23 Id. at 875–78.  The court further noted that the defendant’s conduct in denying the 
plaintiffs and their class not just an equal publicly supported education but all publicly 
supported education while providing such education to other children, violated the Due 
Process Clause.  Id. at 875.  In making this determination, the court looked to Hobson v. 
Hansen, where Judge Skelly Wright stated the following: 
the Court has found the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment elastic enough to embrace not only the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, but the self incrimination clause of the Fifth, 
the speedy trial, confrontation and assistance of counsel clauses of the 
Sixth, and the cruel and unusual clause of the Eighth. . . . From these 
considerations the court draws the conclusion that the doctrine of 
equal educational opportunity—the equal protection clause in its 
application to public school education—is in its full sweep a 
component of due process binding on the District under the due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
269 F. Supp. 401, 493 (D.D.C. 1967). 
24 Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 875; see also Williams v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 441 F.2d 299, 301 
(5th Cir. 1971) (holding that a board of education’s regulation that authorized the 
superintendent of schools to give a thirty-day suspension, in addition to the principal’s ten-
day suspension, without the benefit of a hearing was an invalid denial of due process); 
Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961) (holding that due process 
required notice and some opportunity for a hearing before a student could be expelled for 
misconduct); Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Sch., 306 F. Supp. 1388, 1393 (E.D. Mich. 1969) 
(holding that due process required that the student receive notice containing a statement of 
specific charges and grounds that would justify expulsion, a hearing affording an 
opportunity to hear both the student’s and school district’s side of the events, names of 
witnesses against the student, and an opportunity to present his own defense); Charlene K. 
Quade, A Crystal Clear IDEA:  The Court Confounds the Clarity of Rowley and Contorts 
Brizuela: Making an "IDEA" a Reality: Providing a Free and Appropriate Publ
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
600 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
students with a publicly-supported education, the court rejected the 
school’s claim that it lacked adequate funding to provide all the children 
with educational services.25 
In sum, the courts in PARC and Mills established the principle that 
students with disabilities are entitled to a FAPE.26  Despite these critical 
court decisions, it was not until 1975 that Congress mandated that all 
children with disabilities be afforded a FAPE.27 
                                                                                                             
Congressional Intent, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 37, 54 (2001) (explaining the IDEA’s due 
process safeguard).  The due process safeguards provide parents the opportunity to request 
an administrative hearing if they disagree with the school district regarding their child’s 
rights under the IDEA.  Id.  If the disagreement is not resolved during the administrative 
process, parents may pursue legal action against the school board.  Id.  The IDEA 
empowers courts to review the record of all administrative proceedings, hear additional 
evidence, and grant relief based on a preponderance of the evidence standard.  Id. 
25 Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 876.  The court for the District of Columbia looked to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, a case involving the right of a welfare 
recipient to a hearing before termination of his benefits, which held that constitutional 
rights must be afforded citizens despite the greater expense involved.  Id. (citing Goldberg 
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969)).  The court found that the District of Columbia’s interest in 
educating the excluded children clearly outweighed its financial interest.  Id.  The court 
further stated that if funds were not available to finance all of the services and programs 
required to educate the children, then the available funds must be spent so that no child 
was entirely excluded from receiving a publicly supported education consistent with his 
need and the ability to benefit from the provided services.  Id.; see also MICHAEL J. 
KAUFMAN & SHERELYN R. KAUFMAN, EDUCATION LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 71 (Vicki 
Been ed., 2d ed. 2009) (rejecting cost-based objections to providing services and noting that 
although education is not a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right, states have 
made education compulsory up to a certain age or grade level and thus bear the 
responsibility of creating a mechanism for funding the education of its students from at 
least kindergarten to high school).  But see Siobhan Gorman, Why Special Education Could 
Spark a Veto, 33 NAT’L J. 2482, 2482 (2001) (discussing efforts by members of Congress to 
pass legislation that would fully fund the IDEA); Katherine Kimball, Insuring A Future:  
Mandating Medical Insurance Coverage of Autism Related Treatments in Nebraska, 42 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 689, 715–16 (2009) (discussing how the shortfall in the IDEA’s funding 
has caused public schools across the United States to absorb $381.8 billion dollars in special 
education costs that are left unfunded by the federal government). 
26 See Stacey Gordan, Making Sense of the Inclusion Debate Under IDEA, 2006 BYU EDUC. & 
L.J. 189, 192 (2006) (claiming that PARC and Mills “provided the necessary legal authority 
to include children with disabilities into the public educational system”); see also Bd. of 
Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 180 (1982) (stating that the U.S. Supreme Court, in its 
decision interpreting the EAHCA, noted that Congress was “spurred by two District Court 
decisions [PARC and Mills] holding that handicapped children should be given access to a 
public education”); Hughes & Rebell, supra note 16, at 535 (claiming that PARC and Mills 
led to the development of federal legislation aimed at providing a publicly funded 
education to children with disabilities). 
27 See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94–142, 89 Stat. 
773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C §§ 1400–1482 (2006)) (requiring all public 
schools accepting federal funds to provide children with physical and mental disabilities 
equal access to an education). 
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B. Federal Laws Protecting Students with Disabilities 
In 1975, Congress passed legislation to protect the rights of disabled 
children who had previously been excluded from the public school 
system and denied equal access to the educational opportunities 
available to non-disabled children.28  This legislation, originally known 
as the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (“EAHCA”), 
was amended in 1990 and renamed the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (“IDEA”).29  Since its enactment, the IDEA has been 
reauthorized every seven years.30  The most recent reauthorization in 
2004 renamed the Act the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Improvement Act (“IDEIA”).31 
The IDEA recognizes the following goals:  (1) to provide all 
handicapped children with a FAPE that emphasizes special education 
and related services designed to meet their unique needs; (2) to protect 
the rights of handicapped children and ensure that the families of such 
children have a meaningful opportunity to participate in the education 
of their children; (3) to assist the states in providing for the education of 
all handicapped children; and (4) to assess and ensure the effectiveness 
of efforts to educate handicapped children.32  Eligible children include 
those in need of special education due to mental retardation, hearing 
                                                 
28 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006); see also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 179 (stating that Congress 
enacted this legislation after finding that millions of disabled children were being denied 
an appropriate education and “were either totally excluded from schools or [were] sitting 
idly in regular classrooms awaiting the time when they were old enough to ‘drop out’”). 
29 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L. No. 104–476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990) 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482)). 
30 Shindel, supra note 18, at 1039–40 (discussing the subsequent reauthorizations to the 
IDEA); see also Andrea Valentino, Note, The Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Improvement Act:  Changing What Constitutes an “Appropriate” Education, 20 J.L. & HEALTH 
139, 141 (2007) (discussing the IDEA’s reauthorizations).  The IDEA reauthorizes next in 
2011. 
31 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (amending the IDEA).  Although the 2004 revision officially 
renamed the legislation the IDEIA, for the sake of internal consistency this Note will refer 
to it by its most common name, the IDEA.  See Shindel, supra note 18, at 1039–40 
(explaining the reauthorization process).  Shindel states that reauthorization is required 
when Congress approves sections of a law for a fixed period of time.  
At the termination of the fixed period, Congress must affirmatively re-
approve the select provisions, or the provisions will expire. . . . Even 
with regard to those portions of the IDEA that are permanently 
authorized, the reauthorization process gives Congress an opportunity 
to reconsider and revise the IDEA generally. 
Id. 
32 20 U.S.C. § 1400.  According to Senator Harrison Williams, the IDEA’s principal 
drafter, “[t]his measure fulfills the promise of the Constitution that . . . handicapped 
children no longer will be left out.”  121 CONG. REC. 37,413 (1975) (statement of Sen. 
Williams). 
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impairments, serious emotional disturbances, orthopedic impairments, 
autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairment, or specific 
learning disabilities.33 
In an effort to meet these goals and remedy years of discrimination 
against children with disabilities, the federal government provides 
grants to assist states in providing special education and services.34  In 
order to qualify for federal funding, states must comply with the 
requirements of the IDEA and provide all disabled children between the 
ages of three and twenty-one an opportunity to receive a FAPE that 
includes an IEP favoring an education in the least restrictive 
environment (“LRE”), and integrates disabled children into the regular 
classroom.35  The IEP and LRE are discussed in turn.36 
The IDEA’s individualized education programs require school 
districts to provide every disabled child with a written IEP that caters to 
the child’s specific educational needs.37  A student’s IEP is formulated by 
                                                 
33 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(a).  Specifically, there are fourteen federal terms and definitions 
that guide how states define disability and who is eligible for a free appropriate public 
education under special education law:  (1) autism; (2) deaf-blindness; (3) deafness; (4) 
developmental delay; (5) emotional disturbance; (6) hearing impairment; (7) mental 
retardation; (8) multiple disabilities; (9) orthopedic impairment; (10) other health 
impairments; (11) specific learning disabilities; (12) speech or language impairment; (13) 
traumatic brain injury; (14) visual impairment including blindness.  See Categories of 
Disability Under IDEA Law, NAT’L DISSEMINATION CENTER FOR CHILD. WITH DISABILITIES, 
http://nichcy.org/Disabilities/Categories/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited Sept. 22, 2010) 
(defining the above-listed federal terms).  Autism is a developmental disability 
significantly affecting verbal and nonverbal communication and social interaction, 
generally evident before age three, that adversely affects a child’s educational performance.  
Id. 
34 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (granting federal funding for the education of children with 
disabilities to states that comply with the IDEA’s policies and procedures). 
35 Id. §§ 1412(a)(1), 1412(a)(4)–(5).  Under the IDEA, a FAPE is available “to all children 
with disabilities residing in the State between the ages of 3 and 21, inclusive, including 
children with disabilities who have been suspended or expelled from school.”  Id. 
§1412(a)(1)(A). 
36 See infra note 37 (discussing the IEP requirement); infra note 41 (discussing the LRE 
requirements). 
37 20 U.S.C § 1414(d)(1)(A).  An Individualized Education Plan includes the following: 
 (I) a statement of the child’s present levels of academic 
achievement and functional performance . . .  
. . . . 
 (II) a statement of measurable annual goals, including academic 
and functional goals . . . 
. . . . 
 (III) a description of how the child’s progress toward meeting the 
annual goals . . . will be measured . . . 
 (IV) a statement of the special education and related services and 
supplementary aids and services, based on peer-reviewed research to 
the extent practicable, to be provided to the child, or on behalf of the 
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a team of individuals that typically include the child’s parents, a general 
education teacher, a special education teacher, a district representative, 
an administrator, and a school psychologist or testing specialist.38  These 
individuals must collaborate to address matters such as the child’s 
present level of academic achievement, annual goals for the child, how 
progress toward those goals is to be measured, and the services to be 
provided to the child.39  The IDEA also includes safeguards mandating 
that the child’s parents participate in any meetings pertaining to their 
child’s IEP and that they receive written notice of any proposed changes 
to the IEP.40 
                                                                                                             
child, and a statement of the program modifications or supports for 
school personnel that will be provided for the child . . . 
. . . . 
 (V) an explanation of the extent, if any, to which the child will not 
participate with nondisabled children in the regular class . . .  
 (VI)(aa) a statement of any individual appropriate 
accommodations that are necessary to measure the academic 
achievement and functional performance of the child . . .  
. . . . 
 (VII) the projected date for the beginning of the services and 
modification described . . . . 
Id.  See generally Dixie Snow Huefner, Judicial Review of the Special Education Program 
Requirements Under The Education for Handicapped Children Act:  Where Have We Been and 
Where Should We Be Going?, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 483 (1991) (asserting that courts 
should look to the goals of the child’s IEP to evaluate whether the student’s education is 
appropriate). 
38 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B); see also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988) (explaining the 
formulation of an IEP); Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(discussing the individuals involved in the creation of an IEP). 
39 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)–(VIII) (defining the IEP requirements). 
40 Id. §§ 1415(b)(1), (3); see also Terry Jean Seligmann, Rowley Comes Home to Roost:  
Judicial Review of Autism Special Education Disputes, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 217, 231 
(2005) (explaining that the IDEA’s safeguards allow parents to challenge a school district in 
an impartial hearing before a state administrative hearing officer when they believe their 
child’s rights guaranteed under the IDEA have been violated).  These safeguards include 
the right to examine all relevant records pertaining to the identification, evaluation, and 
educational placement of their child; prior written notice whenever the responsible 
educational agency proposes (or refuses) to change the child’s placement or program; an 
opportunity to present complaints concerning any aspect of the local agency’s provision of 
a free appropriate public education; and an opportunity for an impartial due process 
hearing with respect to any such complaints.  Id. at 231–32.  See also Daniel Caruso, 
Bargaining and Distribution in Special Education, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 183 (2004) 
(discussing parental involvement in the IEP process); Phillip T.K. Daniel, Education for 
Students with Special Needs:  The Judicially Defined Role of Parents in the Process, 29 J.L. & 
EDUC. 1, 9 (2000) (discussing the significance of parental involvement in the IEP process 
and congressional intent behind the IDEA’s procedural safeguards).  “The [IEP] is the 
backbone of parental safeguards.”  Id. at 10.  “[T]he purpose of an IEP meeting is to allow 
the entire IEP team to come to a collaborative decision, and unilateral decisions by a school 
district are not within the spirit of the IDEA.”  Id. at 12. 
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Moreover, the IDEA guarantees children with disabilities a FAPE in 
the LRE.41  This directive requires that disabled students be included in 
regular educational activities to the maximum extent appropriate.42  
Removal of a handicapped child from the regular classroom is only 
permissible “when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is 
such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids 
and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.”43 
In sum, the IEP and LRE requirements provide guidance as to the 
meaning of the IDEA’s FAPE requirement.44  Congress, however, has 
never specifically clarified the definition of a FAPE in the IDEA’s 
subsequent reauthorizations, thus leaving courts with the difficult task of 
interpreting FAPE.45  The failure of Congress to clarify the definition of 
                                                 
41 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A).  The least restrictive environment (“LRE”) requires: 
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, 
including children in public or private institutions or other care 
facilities, are educated with children who are not disabled, and special 
classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with 
disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs only 
when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that 
education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and 
services cannot be achieved satisfactorily. 
Id.; see Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982) (stating that the IDEA was 
Congress’s response to children who “were either totally excluded from schools or [were] 
sitting idly in regular classrooms”) (alteration in original).  The maximization of potential 
standard adopted by the lower courts was further than Congress intended to go.  Id. at 192.  
Therefore, the Court held that “the Act impose[d] no clear obligation upon recipient States 
beyond the requirement [of providing] some form of specialized education.”  Id. at 195; see 
also Allan G. Osborne, Jr., The IDEA’s Least Restrictive Environment Mandate, 88 EDUC. L. REP. 
541, 542 (1994) (discussing the LRE and mainstreaming requirements of the IDEA).  The 
concept of mainstreaming was significantly enhanced by the United States Supreme 
Court’s 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education, which held that racial segregation was 
unconstitutional.  Id. at 550.  Mainstreaming involves the placing of disabled children in 
regular educational environments with nondisabled children for at least some of their 
services.  Id. at 542.  The IDEA does not require mainstreaming in all cases but it does 
require “that each student be educated in an environment that is the least restrictive 
possible and that removal from general education occurs only when absolutely necessary.”  
Id.  Mainstreaming proponents argue that segregated facilities for children with disabilities 
were unequal and provided inadequate educational resources.  Id.; see also Note, Enforcing 
the Right to an Appropriate Education:  The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 
92 HARV. L. REV. 1103, 1120 (1979) (noting that a special education program must be 
provided in the least restrictive environment to be appropriate). 
42 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (defining the LRE requirement). 
43 See id. (explaining the circumstances under which removal of a child from the 
classroom is acceptable). 
44 See Rosenblum, supra note 15, at 2739 (discussing the IDEA requirements). 
45 See Lester Aron, Too Much or Not Enough:  How Have the Circuit Courts Defined a Free 
Appropriate Public Education After Rowley?, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005) (providing a 
detailed breakdown of the circuit courts interpretations of FAPE).  Specifically, the Second, 
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits employ the “meaningful benefit” test.  Id.  
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FAPE is particularly troublesome when determining whether a school 
district’s failure to implement a provision of the student’s IEP violates 
the child’s right to a FAPE.46 
C.  The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of FAPE 
While Congress may not have directly stipulated what constitutes an 
adequate FAPE for students with disabilities, the Supreme Court 
provided some insight in Board of Education v. Rowley.47  In Rowley, the 
parents of a deaf student unsuccessfully challenged a school district’s 
refusal to provide a sign language interpreter for their daughter in a 
regular education classroom.48  Following the grant of certiorari, Justice 
Rehnquist identified the ultimate problem as the failure of the statute’s 
language to include a substantive standard prescribing the level of 
education to be provided to children with disabilities.49 
                                                                                                             
The First, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, conversely, apply the “adequate 
benefit” or “some benefit” test.  Id.  The Seventh Circuit uses a combination of the two tests.  
Id. 
46 See id. at 7 (discussing how the courts have interpreted the FAPE requirement); see 
also, e.g., Burke Co. Bd. of Educ. v. Denton ex rel. Denton, 895 F.2d 973, 983 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(stating that North Carolina’s policy was “to ensure every child a fair and full opportunity 
to reach his full potential”); Stock v. Mass. Hosp. Sch., 467 N.E.2d 448, 453 (Mass. 1984) 
(noting that Massachusetts’ education law requires that special education programs be 
administered “to assure the maximum possible development of a child with special 
needs”). 
47 458 U.S. 176, 203 (1982) (holding that the state must comply with the IDEA’s 
procedures and that the IEP developed must be reasonably calculated to enable the child to 
receive an educational benefit); see also David Ferster, Broken Promises:  When Does a School’s 
Failure to Implement an Individualized Education Program Deny a Disabled Student a Free and 
Appropriate Public Education, available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1000&context=david_ferster (explaining the Rowley decision). 
48 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 184.  The student’s IEP stated that she would be educated in a 
general education classroom; however, her parents requested that she also be provided 
with a qualified sign language interpreter in all of her academic classes in order to benefit 
more from the general education instruction.  Id.  The school district complied with the 
parents’ request, but after a two week experimental period with an interpreter, the school 
district decided that the student did not need these services.  Id.  In rejecting the parents’ 
challenge, the Supreme Court concluded that the statute did not aim to maximize the 
potential of each handicapped child, but rather merely to provide them with access to a 
free public education.  Id. 
49 Id. at 177.  District court Judge Broderick, after noting that the Act did not 
substantively define what type of education was “appropriate,” discussed the possible 
interpretations of the language.  Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 483, 528, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980).  He stated: 
An “appropriate education” could mean an “adequate” education—
that is, an education substantial enough to facilitate a child’s progress 
from one grade to another and to enable him or her to earn a high 
school diploma.  An “appropriate education” could also mean one 
which enables the handicapped child to achieve his or her full 
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In an effort to explain the rights of students under the IDEA, the 
Court set forth a two-part inquiry for determining whether a school 
district satisfied the FAPE requirement.50  First, the state must comply 
with the procedures set forth in the IDEA.51  Second, the IEP must be 
reasonably calculated to confer some educational benefit upon the 
handicapped child.52  Despite the Supreme Court’s effort to clarify the 
definition of an “appropriate education,” the lower courts continue to 
differ in their interpretations regarding what constitutes an appropriate 
education, thus making it difficult to evaluate alleged implementation 
failures.53 
                                                                                                             
potential.  Between those two extremes, however, is a standard which I 
conclude is more in keeping with the regulations, with the Equal 
Protection decisions which motivated the passage of the Act, and with 
common sense.  This standard would require that each handicapped 
child be given an opportunity to achieve his full potential 
commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children. 
Id. at 534.  The decision written by Justice Rehnquist rejected the lower courts’ 
interpretation of the IDEA and reversed the Second Circuit.  Rowley, 458 U.S. at 176–77; see 
also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (holding there is no 
fundamental constitutional requirement to more than a minimally adequate education).  
But see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 215 (White, J. dissenting) (“The [Act’s] basic floor of opportunity 
is . . . intended to eliminate the effects of the handicap, at least to the extent that the child 
will be given an equal opportunity to learn if that is reasonably possible.”). 
50 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206. 
51 Id.  These procedures enable parents of a disabled child to examine school records, 
participate in meetings, and present complaints.  Id. at 183.  Parents must also be given 
notice of any proposals to change the educational placement of their child, and they are 
entitled to an independent educational evaluation.  Id. at 182.  They can initiate an impartial 
due process hearing for failure to comply with the Act and bring a subsequent civil action 
challenging an adverse determination at the hearing.  Id. at 183. 
52 Id. at 207.  The achievement of passing marks and advancement from grade to grade 
will be examined to determine whether a handicapped student has received an educational 
benefit while being educated in a general education classroom of a public school system.  
Id. 
53 See Falzett v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 152 F. App’x. 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(holding that “substantial evidence exist[ed] in the record to support the finding that [the 
school] provided [the student] with meaningful educational benefit despite some failures”); 
Gillette v. Fairland Bd. of Educ., 932 F.2d 551, 554 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that the school 
provided the student with a FAPE even though portions of the IEP were not followed 
because the student was able to achieve satisfactory grades and to advance grade levels); 
Wanham v. Everett Pub. Sch., 550 F. Supp. 2d 152, 160 (D. Mass. 2008) (holding that the 
independent hearing officer did not err in requiring the student to show harm where 
services listed in the IEP were not delivered); Marc V. v. North East Indep. Sch. Dist., 455 F. 
Supp. 2d 577, 594–95 (W.D. Tx. 2006) (holding that the school district implemented the 
student’s IEP by providing a trained, qualified, and certified teacher aide); Clear Creek 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. J.K., 400 F. Supp. 2d 991, 996 (S.D. Tx. 2005) (holding that the district did 
not violate FAPE despite the student’s regression in toilet training because the district did 
provide the student with some benefit); Slama v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2580, 259 F. Supp. 2d 
880, 888–89 (D. Minn. 2003) (holding that a provision providing a specific personal care 
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D. Standards Used to Evaluate a School District’s Failure to Implement a 
Student’s IEP 
The IDEA and the Supreme Court’s failure to adequately define 
what constitutes an appropriate education led the circuit courts to 
develop various standards for evaluating alleged IEP implementation 
failures.54  The circuits have developed three standards:  the Bobby R. 
significant provision standard, the Melissa S. standard examining the 
reasons for the school district’s failure to implement the student’s IEP, 
and the Van Duyn materiality standard.55  These standards are discussed 
in turn.56 
1. The Bobby R. Standard:  Only Failures to Implement Substantial or 
Significant Provisions of an IEP Violate the IDEA 
In 2000, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Houston 
Independent School District v. Bobby R.57  In Bobby R., the parents of a 
learning-disabled student brought suit against the school district for 
allegedly depriving their child of a FAPE as required by the IDEA.58  The 
parents claimed that the school district failed to provide their son with 
the following services enumerated in his IEP:  speech therapy, an 
alphabetic phonics program, highlighted texts, modified tests, and taped 
lectures.59  The court applied the Rowley two-fold inquiry to determine 
whether the school district satisfied the FAPE requirement of the IDEA 
but quickly dispensed with the first prong because the parents did not 
assert that the school district failed to comply with the procedures 
                                                                                                             
attendant was not significant because the other attendants were available to render services 
of similar quality). 
54 See infra Part II.D (discussing the Bobby R., Melissa S., and Van Duyn standards). 
55 See Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that only material failures to implement IEPs violate the IDEA); Melissa S. v. Sch. 
Dist. of Pittsburgh, 183 F. App’x 184, 187 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that the school’s reasons 
for failing to provide the educational aide as required by the student’s IEP should be 
examined); Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding 
that de minimis failures to implement an IEP do not amount to a violation of the IDEA, but 
rather the statute is violated only by failures to implement substantial or significant IEP 
provisions). 
56 See infra Part II.D (discussing the Bobby R., Melissa S., and Van Duyn standards). 
57 Bobby R., 200 F.3d at 341. 
58 Id. at 343. 
59 Id. at 344.  The IEP plan for the child included seven modifications to his educational 
program:  modified tests, taped texts, highlighted texts, extended time for assignments, 
shortened assignments, calculator use, and taped assignments.  Id.  The parents alleged that 
the school district did not provide their son with speech therapy and certain 
accommodations under the IEP—alphabetic phonics program, highlighted texts, modified 
tests, and taped lectures.  Id. 
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prescribed by the IDEA.60  The court then moved to the substantive 
prong of the Rowley inquiry—whether the student’s IEP was reasonably 
calculated to enable him to receive an educational benefit.61 
The court determined that the school district’s failure to implement 
the student’s IEP did not deprive the student of the right to a FAPE 
because the significant provisions of the student’s IEP were followed 
and, as a result, the student received an educational benefit.62  The court, 
however, did not provide an analysis as to why the provisions of the 
                                                 
60 See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982) (establishing a two-part test to 
determine whether a violation of the IDEA occurred).  First, a court must determine 
whether the state complied with the procedures set forth in the IDEA.  Id.  Second, a court 
must determine if the IEP was reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive 
educational benefits.  Id. at 206−07.  The Bobby R. court noted that the issues related to any 
procedural complaints were withdrawn prior to the beginning of the hearing.  Bobby R., 200 
F.3d at 347.  The evidence also showed that the student’s parents were active participants 
in the Admissions, Review, and Dismissal (“ARD”) meeting and that the ARD Committee 
often accepted recommendations and requests in both programming and placements 
decisions.  Id.  The IEP at issue was a result of the collaborative efforts between the parents 
and the school; therefore, the district complied with the procedural requirements of the 
IDEA.  Id. 
61 Bobby R., 200 F.3d at 347.  In determining whether the IEP was reasonably calculated 
to provide the student with a meaningful educational benefit, the Bobby R. court looked to 
its earlier decision in Cypress-Fairbanks where it had previously summarized the  standard 
under Rowley.  An IEP 
need not be the best possible one, nor one that will maximize the 
child’s educational potential; rather, it need only be an education that 
is specifically designed to meet the child’s unique needs, supported by 
services that will permit him “to benefit” from the instruction.  In other 
words, the IDEA guarantees only a “basic floor of opportunity” for 
every disabled child, consisting of “specialized instruction and related 
services which are individually designed to provide educational 
benefit.”  Nevertheless, the educational benefit to which an IEP must 
be geared cannot be mere modicum or de minimis; rather, an IEP must 
be “likely to produce progress, not regression or trivial educational 
advancement.”  In short, the educational benefit that an IEP is 
designed to achieve must be “meaningful.” 
Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F., 118 F.3d 245, 247–48 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(internal citations omitted).  The Cypress-Fairbanks court then set forth four factors that 
serve as an indication of whether the IEP is reasonably calculated to  provide a meaningful 
benefit:  “1) [whether] the program is individualized on the basis of the student’s 
assessment and performance; 2) [whether] the program is administered in the least 
restrictive environment; 3) [whether] the services are provided in a coordinated and 
collaborative manner by the key ‘stakeholders’; and 4) [whether] positive academic and 
non-academic benefits are demonstrated.”  Id. at 253. 
62 Bobby R., 200 F.3d at 349–50.  See generally Michael Rebell, Structural Discrimination and 
the Rights of the Disabled, 74 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1477 (1986) (discussing the “educational benefit” 
standard referenced in Bobby R.). 
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student’s IEP were insignificant.63  Nevertheless, the court created a new 
standard for evaluating a school district’s failure to implement a 
student’s IEP:  a party challenging the implementation of an IEP must 
demonstrate that the school board failed to implement substantial or 
significant provisions of the IEP to prevail under the IDEA.64  The court 
explained that this approach affords local agencies some flexibility in 
implementing IEP’s, but it still holds those agencies accountable for 
material failures and for providing the disabled child with a meaningful 
educational benefit.65 
Following the Fifth Circuit’s lead, the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals took a similar position in Neosho R-V School District v. Clark.66  In 
Clark, the school district sought judicial review of an administrative 
panel’s determination that it had failed to provide an autistic student 
with a FAPE by not developing and implementing an IEP that properly 
included a cohesive behavior management plan.67  The court ruled that 
                                                 
63 Bobby R., 200 F.3d at 349.  The Bobby R. court attempted to define “significant” in a 
footnote.  Id.  The court stated that “determination[s] of what are ‘significant’ provisions of 
an IEP cannot be made from an exclusively ex ante perspective.  Thus, one factor to 
consider under an ex post analysis would be whether the IEP services were provided 
actually conferred an educational benefit.”  Id.  The district courts have attempted to 
analyze the term “significant” from Bobby R., but have arrived at different interpretations.  
David King, Van Duyn v. Baker School District:  A Material Improvement in Evaluating a 
School District’s Failure to Implement Individualized Education Programs, 4 NW. J. SOC. & POL’Y 
457 (2009) (explaining that the district courts have interpreted the Bobby R. standard 
differently); see also, e.g., J.P. ex rel. Peterson v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Hanover Cnty., 447 F. Supp. 
2d 553 (E.D. Va. 2006) (finding that the term “significant” does not refer to the type of 
failure, but rather to the importance of  the provision to the student’s IEP, and whether the 
provision was necessary for the student to receive an educational benefit), rev’d on other 
grounds, 516 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 2008).  But see Leighty v. Laurel Sch. Dist., 457 F. Supp. 2d 
546 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (interpreting the Bobby R. standard to require analysis as to whether the 
student received an educational benefit instead of whether the specific provision was 
“significant”). 
64 Bobby R., 200 F.3d at 349; see also King, supra note 63, at 457 (arguing that it is not 
apparent from the opinion whether the court considered “substantial” to mean “many” 
provisions or whether the court considered “substantial” to be synonymous with 
“significant”). 
65 Bobby R., 200 F.3d at 349.  In addition, the IDEA provides that the child shall remain in 
the current educational placement during the pendency of any proceedings conducted.  Id. 
at 350.  Moreover, parents who unilaterally change their child’s placement during the 
pendency of review proceedings, without the consent of state or local school officials, do so 
at their own financial risk.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3)(A) (2006). 
66 315 F.3d 1022, 1027 (8th Cir. 2002). 
67 Id. at 1022.  Robert Clark suffered from Autism-Asperger’s Syndrome, which made 
him prone to inappropriate behavior when unmanaged and prevented him from 
interacting with his peers in an acceptable manner.  Id. at 1024.  His IEP placed him in a 
self-contained classroom except for music class, established an IEP team to meet every two 
weeks to consider the possibility of additional mainstreaming, and called for a full-time 
paraprofessional to accompany him in all classes.  Id. at 1025.  More importantly, the IEP 
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the IDEA was violated when a school district failed to implement an 
essential element of an IEP that was necessary for the child to receive an 
educational benefit.68  In doing so, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
stated that the analysis set forth in Bobby R. was more accurately suited 
to the posture of the case, but confined its analysis to the framework of 
Rowley because the parties did not make this argument.69 
Therefore, the court held that the school district failed to provide the 
student with an educational benefit by not developing and 
implementing an appropriate behavior management plan as required by 
his IEP.70  However, just like the Bobby R. court, the Clark court also did 
not explain why the IEP provision in question was essential to the 
student’s IEP, thus failing to provide an accurate method by which to 
measure implementation failures.71  The Third Circuit’s Melissa S. 
standard is discussed next.72 
2. The Melissa S. Standard:  Examining the School District’s Reasons for 
Failing to Implement the Student’s IEP 
In Melissa S. v. School District of Pittsburgh, the parents of a student 
with Down’s Syndrome brought suit alleging that the school violated the 
                                                                                                             
stated that a behavior plan was attached, but the attachments were merely short-term goals 
and objectives that did not provide specific interventions and strategies to manage Robert’s 
behavior problems.  Id. at 1025.  There was no contention that the school district failed to 
follow the procedures set forth in the IDEA, rather the dispute involved whether the IEPs 
were reasonably calculated to enable Robert to receive an educational benefit.  Id. at 1027.  
The court’s independent review demonstrated that the IEPs did not appropriately address 
Robert’s behavior problem.  Id. at 1028.  Therefore, the fact that no cohesive plan was in 
place to meet Robert’s behavioral needs supported the court’s conclusion that he was not 
able to obtain a benefit from his education.  Id. at 1029. 
68 Id. at 1027.  The court later noted that the requirements of the IDEA are satisfied when 
a school district provides a disabled student with an individualized education that includes 
services that allow the student to obtain an educational benefit.  Blackburn v. Springfield R-
XII Sch. Dist., 198 F.3d 648, 658 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 
176, 200 (1982)). 
69 See Bobby R., 200 F.3d at 349 (holding that a party challenging the implementation of 
an IEP must demonstrate that the school authorities failed to implement a substantial or 
significant provision of the IEP).  The court in Bobby R. further noted that this standard 
affords schools some flexibility in implementing the IEPs, but still holds them accountable 
for material failures and for providing a meaningful educational benefit.  Id. 
70 Clark, 315 F.3d at 1030. 
71 See King, supra note 63, at 465 n.76 (stating that the student’s autism in Clark was a 
possible explanation as to why the court found that the school district’s failure to 
implement the behavior plan deprived him of the opportunity to obtain an educational 
benefit).  The court found that the behavior plan may have been instrumental in the 
student’s educational development.  Id. 
72 See infra Part II.D.2 (discussing the Melissa S. standard that examines a school district’s 
reasons for failing to implement IEPs). 
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student’s right to a FAPE by failing to provide the student with an 
educational aide every day.73  The court acknowledged that to prevail on 
a claim that a school district failed to implement an IEP, a plaintiff must 
show that the school district failed to implement substantial or 
significant  provisions of the IEP, as opposed to a mere de minimis 
failure, such that the disabled child was denied a meaningful educational 
benefit.74  The court deviated from the Bobby R. standard by focusing not 
on the significance of the provision to the student’s IEP but rather on the 
school’s reasons for failing to comply with the provisions of the IEP.75 
The court held that the school district did not violate the IDEA 
because it was not deliberately indifferent to the student.76  For example, 
although the school did not provide the student with an educational aide 
every day, it either assigned a substitute teacher in the interim or notified 
the mother to keep the student home for the day.77  Thus, the Third 
Circuit appears to have adopted a good faith exception to 
                                                 
73 183 F. App’x 184, 186 (3d Cir. 2006).  Although the court primarily focused on the 
school’s failure to provide an educational aide, the parents also alleged that the school 
failed to provide daily homework assignments and implement a behavioral plan.  Id. at 187. 
74 Id. (citing Bobby R., 200 F.3d at 349); see also T.R. ex rel. N.R. v. Kingwood Bd. of Educ., 
205 F.3d 572, 577 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that a school district is accountable for conferring 
some educational benefit upon the handicapped child under the IDEA).  See generally Bobby 
R., 200 F.3d at 349 (discussing the de minimis standard).  The more than de minimis 
standard comes from the language of Bobby R. in which the Fifth Circuit stated that “a 
party challenging the implementation of an IEP must show more than a de minimis failure 
to implement all elements of that IEP.”  Id.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines de minimis as 
something that is “[t]rifling,” “minimal,” or “so insignificant that a court may overlook it in 
deciding an issue or case.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 496 (9th ed. 2009). 
75 Melissa S., 183 F. App’x at 187.  The court found that the school district did not violate 
the IDEA by failing to implement a behavioral plan for the student because upon observing 
the student’s outbursts early in the school year, the school district almost immediately 
began assessing her behavior.  Id.  Furthermore, when it became apparent that the student’s 
behavioral issues went beyond mere problems adjusting to a new school, the school district 
hired a specialist to examine her behavior, determine its causes, and determine how they 
could make some adjustments through behavioral shaping.  Id. at 188–89. 
76 Id. at 189; see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998) (holding that 
only state conduct that is arbitrary, or conscience shocking in a constitutional sense rises to 
the level of a violation); Gottlieb v. Laurel Highlands Sch. Dist., 272 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 
2001) (explaining that the substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects 
individual liberty against certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the 
procedures used to implement them); Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 375 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (stating that the exact degree of culpability necessary for governmental action to 
be considered conscience shocking varies from case to case). 
77 Melissa S., 183 F. App’x at 187.  The student was not provided with an aide every day 
due to the fact that the aide that was assigned to assist her left the position early in the 
school year.  Id.  A full-time replacement was hired eleven or twelve days later, and a 
substitute teacher was hired during that gap to act as Melissa’s aide.  Id.  Therefore, the 
court found that because the student was never left alone, the school district met its 
obligations to provide a full-time aide.  Id. 
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implementation failures when it found that the school district’s reasons 
for failing to comply with the student’s IEP were reasonable under the 
circumstances.78 
In sharp contrast, the court in Manalansan v. Board of Education of 
Baltimore City directly rejected the use of a good faith exception for IEP 
implementation.79  In Manalansan, the court noted that the good faith 
exception reflects the belief that an educator who tries his or her best to 
help the child should not be penalized if all of the objectives were not 
reached.80  Moreover, under state and federal law, the local educational 
agency had an obligation to implement a student’s IEP; thus, failure to 
provide the related services and supplementary services listed in the IEP 
deprived the disabled child of a FAPE.81  Furthermore, the court stated 
                                                 
78 King, supra note 63, at 468 n.97 (stating that the Melissa S. court did not explicitly state 
that there was a good faith exception, but did so implicitly in its application); see also 
Catalan v. District of Columbia, 478 F. Supp. 2d 73, 76 (D.D.C. 2007) (finding that a school 
district’s failure to follow the IEP requirements to the letter was “excusable under the 
circumstances”—such circumstances included the speech therapist missing a few sessions, 
cutting other sessions short because the student’s fatigue made the therapy unproductive, 
and missing sessions altogether due to snow day, school holidays, and the student’s 
absences). 
79 No. Civ. AMD 01-312, 2001 WL 939699, at *13 (D. Md. Aug. 14, 2001).  In Manalansan, 
the mother of a child with cerebral palsy, hydrocephalus, and a seizure disorder alleged 
that the school district failed to implement his IEP.  Id. at *1, *4.  The investigation 
determined that the student did not receive the speech therapy services he was due; 
however, it could not be determined if he was provided the services of an aide in 
accordance with his IEP.  Id. at *9. 
80 Id. at *13. 
81 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A) (2006) (stating an educational agency’s responsibilities 
under the IDEA).  The IDEA mandates that IEPs include “a statement of the special 
education and related services and supplementary aids and services . . . to be provided to 
the child.”  Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV); see also Haekyoung Suh, The Need for Consistency in 
Interpreting the Related Services Provision Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 
48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1321, 1323 (1996) (discussing the related services requirement of the 
IDEA).  The IDEA defines related services as 
transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other 
supportive services (including speech pathology and audiology, 
psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, 
including therapeutic recreation, social work services, counseling 
services, including rehabilitation counseling, and medical services, except 
that such medical services shall be for diagnostic or evaluation purposes only) 
as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from 
special education, and includes the early identification and assessment 
of disabling conditions in children. 
Id. at 1323–24; see also, e.g., Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 891-95 (1984) 
(narrowing the definition of related services that must be provided to children with 
disabilities under the IDEA).  In Tatro, the Supreme Court stated that for a court to 
determine whether the services constitute a “supportive service,” which is required to 
assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education and if a service is supportive, a 
court must ascertain whether it is excluded from coverage because it is a “medical service” 
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that while the school may have discretion in determining the mode of 
implementation of the IEP, it was nonetheless bound by the mandate 
that those services be provided and “best efforts” to provide those 
services fall short of this requirement.82 
Currently, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits hold that to prevail on a 
claim under the IDEA a party must demonstrate that the school board or 
other authorities failed to implement a substantial or significant 
provision of the student’s IEP.83  Conversely, the Third Circuit deviates 
from this standard by focusing on the school district’s good faith.84  The 
standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit is discussed next.85 
3. The Van Duyn Standard:  Only Material Failures to Implement an 
IEP Violate the IDEA 
In Van Duyn v. Baker School District, the Ninth Circuit became the 
latest circuit to apply a different standard for evaluating a school 
district’s failure to implement a student’s IEP.86  In Van Duyn, the parents 
of a severely autistic child alleged that the school district had failed to 
implement certain services described in their son’s IEP and that this 
failure constituted a deprivation of a FAPE.87  Specifically, the parents 
                                                                                                             
that serves purposes other than diagnosis or evaluation.  Id. at 889–90.  The Court further 
stated that if the services are provided by a licensed physician and are not for diagnosis or 
evaluation, the services are excludable.  Id. at 892. 
82 Manalansan,  2001 WL 939699, at *13. 
83  See Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1027 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that a 
school district violates the IDEA when it fails to implement an essential element of an IEP); 
Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that only 
failures to implement significant provisions of an IEP violate the IDEA). 
84 See Melissa S. v. Sch. District of Pittsburgh, 183 F. App’x 184, 188–89 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(holding that the school district’s reasons for failing to implement an IEP should be 
examined). 
85 See Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that only 
material failures to implement an IEP constitute a deprivation of a FAPE and thus a 
violation of the IDEA). 
86 Id.  This case arose as a result of the student’s transition from elementary to middle 
school.  Id. at 814; see also Elexis Reed, The Individuals with Disabilities Act—The Ninth Circuit 
Determines That Only a Material Failure to Implement an Individualized Education Program 
Violates The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 61 SMU L. REV. 495 (2008) (discussing 
the Van Duyn court’s approach to evaluating IEP implementation failures). 
87 Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 815.  The child’s IEP called for him to work on language arts, 
reading, and writing for six t seven hours per week, math computation/math computer 
drills for eight to ten hours per week, and adaptive P.E. gymnastics and swimming for 
three to four hours per week.  Id.  Van Duyn’s IEP also included a behavior management 
plan that was to be implemented full-time.  Id. at 816.  The IEP additionally called for 
material to be presented at the child’s level and for him to be placed in a self-contained 
special education classroom.  Id.  Finally, other provisions required the regional autism 
specialist to visit the school twice per week, augmentative communication services to be 
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argued that the school district failed to train his teachers and aides, that 
he was not placed in a self-contained classroom, that he did not receive 
one-on-one instruction, that the district did not implement a behavioral 
plan, and that the school district failed to provide daily instruction in 
oral language, reading, and math skills.88  After a due process hearing 
pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f), the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) 
found that the school district failed to implement the IEP with regard to 
the child’s math goals because he was not given the requisite hours of 
weekly math instruction indicated in his IEP.89  Nevertheless, the ALJ 
ruled in favor of the school district in every other contested area.90 
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the majority first turned to Rowley’s 
interpretation of what constitutes a FAPE under the IDEA.91  Although 
the Rowley Court was faced with a challenge to an IEP’s content, the 
Ninth Circuit extended Rowley to the IEP implementation context.92  In 
particular, the Rowley Court found that procedural flaws in an IEP’s 
formulation did not automatically violate the IDEA, but rather did so 
only when the resulting IEP was not reasonably calculated to enable the 
child to receive educational benefits.93  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit 
reasoned that minor failures in following the IDEA’s procedural 
requirements were not automatically treated as violations of the statute.94 
                                                                                                             
provided for two hours per month, Van Duyn’s aide to receive state autism training, and 
quarterly reports to measure his progress.  Id. 
88 Id. at 816–17. 
89 Id.   
90 Id. at 816.  For example, the ALJ found that Van Duyn’s aide and teachers were 
properly trained and worked with him on oral language skills.  Id. at 817.  Additionally, 
Van Duyn was properly placed in a self-contained classroom, received daily instruction in 
reading, and was sent home each day with a note.  Id.  Although the school district had 
initially failed to implement these portions of the IEP, the LJ found that these portions were 
now being followed.  Id.  The Van Duyns appealed the ALJ’s decision to the district court.  
Id.  The district court concluded that there had been no failure to implement a substantial 
provision of the IEP because the school district complied with the ALJ’s order that 
additional math instruction be provided to the student.  Id.  The parents appealed to the 
Ninth Circuit.  Id 
91 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006).  Procedural flaws in formulation of an IEP do not 
automatically violate the IDEA; they do so only when the resulting IEP is not reasonably 
calculated to enable a child to receive an educational benefit.  Id.; see also id. § 1401(9) 
(defining a free appropriate education as “specialized education and related services 
that . . . are provided in conformity with the [child’s] individualized education program”). 
92 Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 821. 
93 Id. (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982)). 
94 Id.  The court further stated that the Supreme Court’s description of the IDEA’s 
purpose as providing a “basic floor of opportunity” to disabled students rather than a 
“potential-maximizing education” also supports granting some flexibility to the school 
districts.  Id. (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200). 
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The Ninth Circuit then turned to the Fifth and Eighth Circuits that 
had explicitly addressed IEP implementation failures for further support 
of its reading of the statutory text of the IDEA and Rowley.95  The court 
concluded that only a material failure to implement an IEP violated the 
IDEA.96  According to the majority, a material failure occurred when 
there was more than a minor discrepancy between the services required 
by the student’s IEP; it did not require that a child suffer demonstrable 
educational harm in order to prevail.97  In applying the materiality 
standard to the parents’ claims, the court held that the services provided 
by the school district were not materially different from what was 
required by the IEP and that only the school district’s failure to provide 
the requisite math instruction constituted a deprivation of a FAPE under 
the IDEA.98 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Ferguson criticized the majority’s 
materiality standard as being inconsistent with the text of the IDEA, 
inappropriate for the judiciary, and unworkably vague.99  First, Judge 
Ferguson argued that the school district failed to comply with an IEP to 
which it had expressly assented, violating the language in the IDEA that 
leaves no room for the courts to make a materiality determination.100  It 
                                                 
95 Id. at 821–22. 
96 Id. at 822. 
97 Id.  Due to the parties’ debate over whether the child’s skills and behavior improved 
or deteriorated during the school year, the court felt it was essential to clarify that its 
materiality standard does not require that the child suffer demonstrable educational harm 
in order to prevail.  Id. 
98 Id. at 826. 
99 Id. (Ferguson, J., dissenting).  Judge Ferguson stated that given the extensive process 
and expertise involved in the crafting an IEP, the failure to implement any portion of the 
IEP to which the school has agreed is necessarily material.  Id.; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, 
The Judiciary's Now-Limited Role in Special Education, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO 
COURTHOUSE 121, 122 (Joshua M. Dunn & Martin R. West. eds., 2009) (discussing the 
judiciary’s role in special education litigation). 
There are two possible ways the courts might affect education when 
they implement the IDEA.  They might do so directly, by ordering 
schools to take or refrain from certain actions as a remedy for a proven 
violation of the statute.  Or they might do so indirectly, as their legal 
rulings cast a shadow over the actions of educators, students, and 
parents. 
 In view of the limited number of cases brought under the IDEA, 
the courts have likely had a far greater indirect effect than a direct one 
on school practices. 
Id. at 122. 
100 Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 827 (Ferguson, J., dissenting); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(D) 
(2006) (“The term ‘free appropriate public education’ means special education and related 
services that . . . are provided in conformity with the individualized education program.”); 
34 C.F.R. § 300.323(c)(2) (2010) (“Each public agency must ensure that . . . special education 
and related services are made available to the child in accordance with the child’s IEP.”); 
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would be inappropriate for the judiciary to determine what parts of an 
agreed-upon IEP were not material.101  He reasoned that IEP teams, 
consisting of experts, teachers, parents, and the student, were in the best 
position to determine the needs of a special education student.102  Finally, 
he argued that the majority standard was too vague because it provided 
little guidance as to what constituted a minor discrepancy.103  Therefore, 
Judge Ferguson determined that the materiality standard was an 
inappropriate method by which to evaluate implementation failures.104 
In summary, the view shared by both the Fifth and the Eighth 
Circuits contradicts the view of the Third Circuit and the Ninth Circuit 
concerning whether a school district’s failure to implement a provision 
of the student’s IEP violates the student’s rights under the IDEA.105  The 
circuits have developed different interpretations of what constitutes a 
FAPE, which has led to divergent standards among the courts for 
evaluating IEP failures.106 
III.  ANALYSIS 
While the IDEA has generated considerable litigation regarding 
what constitutes a FAPE, it is undisputed that the IEP is the centerpiece 
                                                                                                             
M.L. v. Fed. Way Sch. Dist. 394 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting the statutory 
definition of FAPE). 
101 Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 827 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).  Judicial review of the content of 
an IEP would be appropriate when the student or the student’s parents challenge the 
sufficiency of the IEP.  Id. (citing M.L. v. Fed. Way Sch. Dist., 394 F.3d at 642). 
102 Id.  Judge Ferguson further stated that if after implementing the IEP, the school district 
believes that portions of the program are not essential to providing FAPE, it is free to 
amend the IEP through the required channels, including a reconvening of the IEP team.  Id. 
at 828.  Allowing the school district to disregard already agreed-upon portions of the IEP 
would essentially give the school district a license to unilaterally redefine the content of the 
student’s plan by default.  Id.  Moreover, such unilateral action by the school district 
ignores the parental participation provision of the IDEA.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(A)(ii) 
(2006) (requiring that IEP teams consider the parents’ concerns in the progress of their 
child’s education). 
103 Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 828 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).  Specifically, he stated that most 
IEPs contain quantitative requirements for special education services, thus the majority’s 
standard will provide little guidance in resolving implementation issues.  Id. 
104 Id. at 829.  In his dissenting opinion, Judge Ferguson adopted a per se approach to 
implementation failures by suggesting that the school district’s failure to fully implement 
the IEP violated the IDEA.  See id. at 828; see also Reed, supra note 86, at 499 (arguing that 
the Van Duyn court established the incorrect standard for assessing IEP implementation 
failures and that it further diminishes the educational rights of disabled children). 
105 See supra Part II.D (discussing the conflicting standards used by the Third, Fifth, 
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits). 
106 See supra Part II.D (discussing the different outcomes of the standards the Third, Fifth, 
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have applied when evaluating IEP failures). 
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of the IDEA.107  As a result, IEPs are imperative to the education of 
children with disabilities, and the failure to implement a provision of an 
IEP can result in harm to the child.108  Part III analyzes why the 
approaches adopted by the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits for 
evaluating IEP implementation failures are ill-founded and inconsistent 
with the purpose of the IDEA, and it examines why the alternative 
approach supported by the Manalansan court and the Van Duyn dissent 
is more appropriate.109  Specifically, Part III.A analyzes why the Bobby R. 
standard is an ill-founded and impractical approach for evaluating IEP 
implementation failures.110  Second, Part III.B analyzes the reasons why 
the Melissa S. court’s approach is a dangerous standard by which to 
evaluate a school district’s failure to implement an IEP.111  Finally, Part 
III.C analyzes why the Van Duyn standard is flawed and inconsistent 
with congressional intent.112 
                                                 
107 See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988) (noting that the IEP is the “primary vehicle” 
and “centerpiece of [IDEA’s] education delivery system”); Manalansan v. Bd. of Educ., No. 
Civ. AMD 01-312, 2001 WL 939699, at *8 (D. Md. Aug. 14, 2001) (describing the importance 
of the IEP in fulfilling the FAPE requirement of the IDEA); Caruso, supra note 40, at 176 
(describing IEPs as educational entitlements conferred by law to each eligible child on the 
basis of stated criteria and with due process guarantees); Seligmann, supra note 40, at 223 
(describing the IEP as the central document defining the special education and services that 
are to be provided to a child with a disability); see also Kalaei, supra note 19, at 728–40 
(stating that Congress concluded that the achievement of IEP goals directly determines a 
student’s academic progress and arguing that the IEP is an essential method of ensuring 
equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self 
sufficiency for individuals with disabilities); Valentino, supra note 30, at 157 (stating that an 
IEP serves as a measure of whether a child is receiving a free appropriate public education). 
108 See, e.g., Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1030 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding 
that a school district’s failure to develop and implement a behavioral plan for a student 
with Autism-Asperger’s Syndrome prevented him from making educational progress); 
Manalansan, 2001 WL 939699, at *5 (noting that a seven-year-old with cerebral palsy made 
little progress in gross and fine motor skills as they appeared to have remained at the age 
level of three and a half years).  See generally Kalaei, supra note 19, at 738−40 (explaining the 
importance of IEP evaluations especially for children with autism because such students 
often regress to abnormal behaviors, lose attained language, and withdraw from others). 
109 See infra Part III (examining why the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits’ stances 
regarding IEP implementation failures—that only significant, material, or non-good faith 
failures violate the IDEA—are illogical and inconsistent with the IDEA). 
110 See infra Part III.A (discussing how the Bobby R. standard excessively burdens a 
student’s right to FAPE, is ambiguous, and undermines the congressional intent of the 
IDEA). 
111 See infra Part III.B (discussing how the Melissa S. standard creates a dangerous 
precedent and increases the potential for abuse by school districts). 
112 See infra Part III.C (discussing how the Van Duyn standard is inconsistent with the 
mandates of the IDEA). 
Brizuela: Making an "IDEA" a Reality: Providing a Free and Appropriate Publ
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
618 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
A. Why the Bobby R. Standard Is an Inappropriate Method of Evaluating IEP 
Implementation Failures 
The Fifth Circuit’s approach to evaluating IEP implementation 
failures—that only failures to implement a substantial or significant 
portion of an IEP violate the IDEA—is ill-founded and impractical.113  
Such an approach excessively burdens a student’s right to a FAPE, is 
ambiguous, and undermines the intent of Congress.114 
                                                 
113  See, e.g., Manalansan, 2001 WL 939699, *13.  The Manalansan court explained that 
“[s]uch a holding would seem to reflect a belief that the IDEA serves a deterrent function 
and creates substantive rights that can be enforced even if a child has been lucky enough to 
make progress despite a school district’s failure to comply with federal law.”  Id. at *14.  
The Manalansan court also criticized the approach adopted by Bobby R., finding that “[i]t is 
hard to see how such services [enumerated in the IEP] could be anything but substantial 
and material.”  Id. at *12.  Moreover, the Catalan court explained: 
[T]he Fifth Circuit’s language [in Bobby R.] easily could be misread as 
contemplating an abstract inquiry into the significance of the various 
“provisions” of the IEP, rather than a contextual inquiry into the 
materiality (in terms of impact on the child’s education) of the failures 
to meet the IEP requirements.  This is a subtle distinction, but, in this 
court’s view, an important one.  Very few, if any “provisions” of an 
IEP will be insignificant or insubstantial, and the Bobby R. standard 
should not be read to allow educators to distinguish in the abstract 
between important and unimportant IEP requirements.  To the 
contrary, all the requirements in an IEP are significant, and educators 
should strive to satisfy them.  It is in the contextual, ex post analysis—
i.e., whether the requirements are feasible and in the best interest of 
the child as she progresses—that questions of substantiality and 
significance arise. 
Catalan v. District of Columbia, 478 F. Supp. 2d 73, 76 (D.D.C. 2007) (internal citations 
omitted) (parentheticals omitted).  But see id. at 75 (acknowledging that the consensus 
approach to failure-to-implement cases among the federal courts that have addressed it has 
been to adopt the Fifth Circuit’s approach in Bobby R.). 
114 See generally King, supra note 63, at 463–67.  The ambiguity behind the Bobby R. 
standard arises from the fact that the court did not engage in discussion about whether the 
IEP provisions were significant; it merely stated that “the significant provisions of [the 
student’s] IEP were followed, and as a result, he received an educational benefit.”  Id. 
(quoting Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 2000)) (alteration 
in original).  Moreover, King also points out that the phrase “substantial portion” only 
appears three times in the Bobby R. court’s opinion, most notably when the court analyzed 
the school district’s failure to provide a speech therapist to the student.  Id. at 464 n.68  As a 
result, not all courts have strictly interpreted the Bobby R. standard in the same manner.  
See, e.g., J.P. Peterson v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Hanover Cnty., 516 F.2d 254 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(applying the significant requirement to the specific provision of the student’s IEP in 
question; thus the term “significant” applies not to the type of failure, but rather to how 
important the provision was to the student’s IEP, and whether the provision was required 
for the student to receive an educational benefit); Mr. C. v. Main Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 6, 
No. 06-198-P-H, 2007 WL 4206166, at *24–25 (D. Me. Nov. 28, 2007) (evaluating the 
significance of a student’s behavioral plan in relation to other provisions). 
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First, in Bobby R., the Fifth Circuit held that only failures to 
implement a substantial or significant portion of an IEP violate the 
IDEA.115  Under this standard, a court looks to whether the IEP services 
that were provided actually conferred an educational benefit upon the 
student.116  Therefore, in determining that the school district did not 
violate the IDEA, the Bobby R. court focused on the fact that the student’s 
test scores and grade levels in math, written language, passage 
comprehension, calculation, applied problems, dictation, writing, word 
identification, broad reading, basis reading cluster, and proofing 
improved during the course of the school year.117 
                                                 
115 Bobby R., 200 F.3d at 349.  The court’s holding is grounded on its interpretation of 
Rowley as conferring no additional requirement that the services provided be sufficient to 
maximize the each child’s potential.  Id. at 346.  The court also reasoned that the “basic floor 
of opportunity” provided by the IDEA grants access to specialized instruction and related 
services which are individually designed to provide educational benefits to handicapped 
children.  Id. 
116 Id. at 349.  The court noted that the achievement of passing marks and advancement 
from grade to grade will be one important factor in determining whether the student 
derived an educational benefit.  Id.; see also Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. 4 v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 
11 (1993) (noting that the measure of an appropriate education is “progress from grade to 
grade.”).  But see L.B. ex rel. K.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966, 978 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(finding that the student benefited significantly from her private mainstream preschool 
because her performance at her private preschool far exceeded the legal measure of an 
appropriate education, which was progress from grade to grade); Scorah v. District of 
Columbia, 322 F. Supp. 2d 12, 20–21 (D.D.C. 2004) (holding that a student who transferred 
from a public special education program to a private school and showed marked 
improvement was denied FAPE in the public school); Fisher v. Bd. of Educ., 856 A.2d 552, 
558−59 (Del. 2004) (finding that a student who made progress under IEP and later 
regressed was denied FAPE). 
117 Bobby R., 200 F.3d at 349.  The school district employed the widely utilized and 
accepted Woodcock-Johnson intelligence and achievement test to indicate the child’s 
academic progress.  Id. at 349 n.3. 
[The child’s] test scores showed the following changes from 1993 to 
1995:  (1) math scores improved from the 1.7 grade level to 3.1; (2) 
written language improved from the 1.5 grade level to 1.9; (3) passage 
comprehension went from 1.7 to 2.2; (4) calculation rose from 1.4 to 3.3; 
(5) applied problems improved from 2.0 to 3.0; (6) dictation went from 
1.6 to 1.8; (7) writing improved from 1.4 to 2.6; (8) word identification, 
basic reading skills, and letter identification rose from 1.8 to 2.1; and 
(9) word attack rose from the level of a seven-month kindergarten 
student to grade level 1.8. 
 From 1995 to 1996, [the child] showed the following 
improvements:  (1) Broad reading increased from 2.1 to 3.3; (2) word 
identification from 2.1 to 2.8; (3) passage comprehension from 2.2 to 
3.9; (4) math from 3.1 to 4.4; (5) calculation from 3.3 to 5.0; (6) applied 
problems from 3.0 to 3.6; (7) written language from 1.9 to 2.9; (8) 
dictation from 1.8 to 2.8; (9) writing samples from 2.6 to 3.3; (10) basic 
reading cluster from 2.1 to 2.8; and (11) proofing from 2.3 to 2.6.  Only 
word attack remained the same, at the 1.8 grade level. 
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This interpretation to implementation failure is impractical and 
creates dangerous implications because it finds that an IEP is not 
significant if the student received an educational benefit.118  As both 
Bobby R. and Leighty v. Laurel School District have demonstrated, a school 
district could completely fail to implement a significant element of an 
IEP and yet not violate the IDEA if the student received even the most 
minimal educational benefit.119  This result is inconsistent with the 
IDEA’s goal of assuring the effectiveness of efforts to educate 
handicapped children because it allows school districts to escape liability 
when it is otherwise clear that the IDEA was violated, merely because 
the child was fortunate enough to make some educational progress.120 
                                                                                                             
Id. 
118 See King, supra note 63, at 461−62 (discussing the criticisms of focusing on the 
student’s educational benefit); Seligmann, supra note 40, at 228 (stating the educational 
benefit standard has acquired some judicial gloss).  “The most colorful metaphor speaks of 
the child as entitled to a ‘serviceable Chevrolet’ as opposed to a Cadillac.”  Id. (quoting Doe 
v. Bd. of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 459 (6th Cir. 1993)); see also Nein v. Greater Clark Cnty. Sch. 
Corp., 95 F. Supp. 961, 977 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (finding the district’s plan was a “Chevrolet 
without a transmission—even if the engine might run, no power ever reached the wheels”). 
119 See, e.g., Leighty v. Laurel Sch. Dist., 457 F. Supp. 2d 546, 555−56 (W.D. Pa. 2006) 
(explaining the signs of progress made by the child led to a determination that the school 
district did not violate the right to FAPE).  In Leighty, the parents of a learning-disabled 
child alleged that the school district failed to implement a learning-disabled student’s IEP 
by not placing specific emphasis on the skill-related goals contained in the student’s IEP.  
Id. at 555.  The district court held that the school district did not violate the student’s right 
to FAPE because the student’s teacher testified that she made “meaningful progress” and 
“remarkable improvement,” and an assessment showed “mixed progress.”  Id. at 555–56; 
see also Falzett v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 152 F. App’x 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding 
that “substantial evidence exists in the record to support the finding that [the school] 
provided [the student] with meaningful educational benefit despite some failures”); 
Gillette v. Fairland Bd. of Educ., 932 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that the school 
provided the student with a FAPE despite the fact that the portions of the FAPE were not 
followed because the student was able to achieve satisfactory grades and to advance grade 
levels); Wanham v. Everett Pub. Sch., 550 F. Supp. 2d 152, 160 (D. Mass. 2008) (holding that 
the independent hearing officer did not err in requiring the student to show harm where 
services listed in the IEP were not delivered); Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist. v. J.K., 400 F. 
Supp. 2d 991, 996 (S.D. TX. 2005) (holding that the district did not violate FAPE despite the 
student’s regression in toilet training because the district did provide the student with 
“some benefit”); Burke v. Amherst Sch. Dist., No. 08-cv-0140-SM, 2008 WL 5382270, *11–12 
(D.N.H. Dec. 18, 2008) (holding that “here, as in Bobby R., the record demonstrates 
academic achievement” and therefore “the District’s failure to implement the videotaping 
objective did not deprive [the student] of a FAPE”) (internal citations omitted). 
120 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(4) (2006).  Congress amended the purpose of the IDEA to 
“ensure the effectiveness of efforts to educate children with disabilities.”  Id.  The IDEA 
further states “our national policy of ensuring equality of opportunity, full participation, 
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for individuals with disabilities.”  Id. 
§ 1400(c)(1). 
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Second, after announcing its new standard for evaluating IEP 
failures, the Fifth Circuit did not explain the meaning of the word 
“substantial” as used in its test for evaluating IEP failures.121  As a result, 
it is not apparent from the opinion whether the court considered 
“substantial” to mean “many” provisions or whether the court 
considered “substantial” to be synonymous with “significant.”122  The 
court’s failure to make this distinction renders the Fifth Circuit’s 
standard an unworkable method by which to evaluate IEP 
implementation failures.123 
Finally, the Fifth Circuit’s standard is also ill-founded and frustrates 
the congressional intent of the IDEA.124  The IDEA provides children a 
                                                 
121 See Bobby R., 200 F.3d at 349.  The court only stated that “the significant provisions of 
[the student’s] IEP were followed, and, as a result, he received an educational benefit.”  Id. 
122 King, supra note 63, at 464; see also, e.g., Catalan v. District of Columbia, 478 F. Supp. 
2d 73, 76 (D.D.C. 2007) (illustrating the ambiguity created by the Bobby R. court’s failure to 
define or distinguish between a “significant” provision and a “substantial” provision of an 
IEP).  The Catalan court stated that a court reviewing failure-to-implement claims under 
IDEA must ascertain whether the aspects of the IEP that were not followed were 
“substantial or significant;” in other words, whether the deviations from the IEP's stated 
requirements were “material.”  Id. at 75−76. The court further observed that the Fifth 
Circuit's language easily could be misread as contemplating an abstract inquiry into the 
significance of various “provisions” (however that term may be defined) of the IEP, rather 
than a contextual inquiry into the materiality (in terms of impact on the child’s education) 
of the failures to meet the IEP’s requirements.  Id. at 76. 
123 See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 607 (1973) (holding that a regulation is 
unconstitutionally vague if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its 
meaning or if it fails to give adequate warning of the conduct which is to be prohibited and 
does not set out explicit standards for those who apply it); see also Rebell, supra note 62, at 
1477 (arguing that the “educational benefit” standard is inherently ambiguous and 
unworkable).  Aside from its inherent ambiguity the “educational benefit” standard does 
not provide substantive content for the balancing process and looks only to one side of the 
equation.  Id.  But see Judith Welch Wegner, Variations on a Theme—The Concept of Equal 
Educational Opportunity and Programming Decisions Under the Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act of 1975, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 169, 190–91 (1985) (concluding that the 
adoption of the “educational benefits” standard was sound and perhaps inevitable because 
it avoids justiciability concerns). 
124  See Quade, supra note 24, at 57−58 (stating that Congress did not intend for school 
districts to be able to discharge their duties under the IDEA by only providing a program 
that produces some minimal academic advancement).  Congress crafted amendments to 
the IDEA with the intent of providing children with disabilities with educational 
opportunities, but congressional review of the IDEA in 1997 found that that the promise of 
the law had not been fulfilled.  Id. at 38.  Consequently, Congress amended the IDEA to 
raise the substantive requirements of the IDEA to include the development of a child’s IEP.  
Id. at 39.  Congressional intent thus clearly indicates that the purpose of the IDEA was to 
ensure that children with disabilities receive a quality education, preparing them to be 
productive, independent, and employed adults.  Id.  Therefore, the “educational benefits” 
standard can no longer be complacent with merely “opening the door” to an educational 
opportunity for children with disabilities because doing so effectively erodes the civil 
rights of children with disabilities and frustrates the congressional intent of the IDEA.  Id. 
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right to a FAPE.125  For a child with disabilities, making this right a 
reality includes providing supplemental and assistive services that allow 
the child to be placed in a position to receive the same benefits as a child 
without disabilities.126  Exactly what services must be provided is a task 
specifically delegated to IEP teams.127  However, if a school later 
determines that some lesser assistance is appropriate and would like to 
modify the student’s IEP to reflect these changes, the school district must 
follow the procedures enumerated in the IDEA.128  The inclusion of these 
procedural safeguards suggests that Congress did not intend for school 
districts to unilaterally alter or refuse to implement IEPs; therefore, 
doing so violates the student’s right to a FAPE.129  Unlike the Fifth 
                                                                                                             
at 41; see also Valentino, supra note 30, at 157 (arguing that the “educational benefit” 
standard does not coincide with the recent standards set forth by the IDEA and 
congressional intent).  Congressional intent, in addition to the language of the IDEA, 
demands a more rigorous substantive standard in educating students with disabilities.  Id. 
at 162.  Therefore, the some “educational benefit” standard does not effectuate Congress’s 
goal to ensure substantive results and does not pass muster under the standards Congress 
sought with the issuance of the IDEA.  Id. at 163. 
125 See supra Part II.B (detailing the IDEA’s requirements). 
126 See Suh, supra note 81, at 1323−24 (explaining the related services provision of the 
IDEA and the benefits such services provide children with disabilities); see also, e.g., Irving 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 893−94 (1984) (clarifying the definition of related 
services that must be provided to children with disabilities under the IDEA in order to 
provide the child with the same benefits as non-handicapped children). 
127 20 U.S.C § 1414(d)(1)(B) (2006); see, e.g., Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 
827 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that under the IDEA, once a school district identifies or assesses 
a student as learning disabled, it must convene an IEP team to determine the special needs 
of the child); see also Manalansan v. Bd. of Educ., No. Civ. AMD 01-312, 2001 WL 939699, at 
*14 (D. Md. Aug. 14, 2001) (stating that a school district does not have the discretion to 
decline to implement the services listed in the IEP or decide unilaterally, without initiating 
an IEP meeting to institute a change, that a service listed in the IEP need not be provided). 
128 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(F); see Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 828 (stating that if after 
implementing the IEP the school district believes that portions of the program are not 
essential to providing FAPE, the school district is free to amend the IEP through the 
required channels, including a reconvening of the IEP team); see also 34 C.F.R. 
§ 300.324(a)(4) (2009) (stating that IEPs may also be amended informally without an IEP 
team meeting).  The regulations explain that in making changes to a child’s IEP after the 
annual IEP team meeting for a school year, the parent of a child with a disability and the 
public agency may agree not to convene an IEP team meeting for the purposes of making 
those changes, and instead may develop a written document to amend or modify the 
child’s current IEP.  Id. § 300.324(a)(4)(i).  If changes are made to the child’s IEP the public 
agency must ensure that the child’s IEP team is informed of those changes.  Id. 
§ 300.324(a)(4)(ii). 
129 See Rosenblum, supra note 15, at 2739.  An IEP is to be produced by a team of parents, 
educators, and administrators working cooperatively to develop a comprehensive 
statement of the educational needs of children with disabilities.  Id.  Congress tried to 
ensure the full participation of all parties in the formulation of IEPs and the IDEA process 
as a whole by incorporating an elaborate set of procedural safeguards into the statute.  Id.  
Moreover, the IDEA gives parents the right to examine all records relating to the child and 
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Circuit, the Third Circuit, avoided making decisions regarding the 
significance of a particular provision of the IEP and it is discussed 
next.130 
B. The Implications of the Melissa S. Standard 
In Melissa S., the Third Circuit’s standard for assessing IEP 
implementation failures did not focus on how significant or material a 
particular provision was to the student’s IEP but instead focused on the 
school district’s reasons for not implementing the student’s IEP.131  The 
Third Circuit was correct in not examining the educational significance 
of a particular IEP provision because, as the Van Duyn dissent and 
Manalansan court correctly pointed out, such determinations are the 
responsibility of the IEP teams.132  Following this logic, the court found 
that the school district’s reasons for failing to provide the child with an 
aide were in good faith or reasonable and therefore did not violate the 
student’s right to a FAPE.133 
The court’s line of reasoning improperly grants school districts a 
“good faith effort” excuse to implementation failures.  Such a defense 
creates a dangerous precedent and increases the potential for abuse by 
school districts.134  To illustrate, a school district may escape liability, 
even after completely disregarding certain provisions of an IEP, merely 
by arguing that the services required by the IEP were too burdensome or 
                                                                                                             
to participate in meetings with respect to the identification, evaluation, and educational 
placement of the child and to obtain an independent educational evaluation of the child.  
Id.; see Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982) (noting that the congressional 
emphasis upon full participation of concerned parties throughout the development of the 
IEP, as well as the requirements that state and local plans be submitted to the Secretary for 
approval, demonstrate the legislative conviction that adequate compliance with the 
procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished 
in the way of substantive content in an IEP); see also Daniel, supra note 40, at 10−11 
(discussing the significance of parental involvement in the IEP process and congressional 
intent behind the IDEA’s procedural safeguards). 
130 See infra Part III.B (analyzing the Third Circuit’s approach to evaluating IEP 
implementation failures). 
131 See Melissa S. v. Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh, 183 F. App’x 184, 187 (3d Cir. 2006). 
132 See supra text accompanying note 127 (explaining that Congress specifically delegated 
the task of determining the services that must be provided to students with disabilities to 
IEP teams). 
133 Melissa S., 183 F. App’x at 187. 
134 See Manalansan v. Bd. of Educ., No. Civ. AMD 01-312, 2001 WL 939699, at *15 (D. Md. 
Aug. 14, 2001) (arguing that the a “best efforts” standard makes the agreement reached by 
the IEP team mean little in terms of a guarantee of services for children with special needs 
and sets a dangerous precedent). 
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complex for the school district to implement.135  As the Manalansan court 
pointed out, a “good faith effort” excuse should not be permitted when 
school districts fail to implement the services in a student’s IEP because a 
good faith effort does not meet the statutory and regulatory commands 
of the IDEA.136  Therefore, allowing school districts to escape liability 
frustrates the IDEA’s goal of assuring the effectiveness of efforts to 
educate handicapped children.137  Likewise, the Ninth Circuit’s standard 
suffers from similar defects and is discussed in turn.138 
                                                 
135 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Michael R., No. 02 Civ. 6098, 2005 WL 2008919, at *12 (N.D. Ill. 
Aug. 15, 2005).  The court found the school district not liable for failing to implement a 
behavioral plan for a student with Rett’s syndrome because the “root of the problem in 
implementing the plan was not the staff, but the complexity of [the student’s] plan and the 
difficulties of carrying it out in a large, regular education high school.”  Id.; see also, e.g., 
Catalan v. District of Columbia, 478 F. Supp. 2d 73, 76 (D.D.C. 2007) (finding that the 
failure to implement the therapy provision of a student’s IEP was excusable under the 
circumstances because the student’s fatigue made it difficult for the school district to 
implement).  But see, e.g., Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 79 (1999) 
(rejecting cost-based objections to providing special needs student with health aide as a 
related service); Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972) (noting that if 
sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the services and programs that are needed 
and desirable in the system then the available funds must be expended equitably); 
KAUFMAN & KAUFMAN, supra note 25, at 71 (noting that by guaranteeing free public 
education, states have rejected cost-based objections to providing services).  But see 
Kimball, supra note 25, at 716 (discussing the implications of the shortfall in the IDEA’s 
funding on schools); Gorman, supra note 25, at 2482 (discussing federal funding per pupil 
expenditures for special education). 
136 Manalansan, 2001 WL 939699, at *13.  The Manalansan court stated that the “good 
faith” defense is grounded on a misinterpretation of the IDEA regulations.  Id.  The court 
acknowledges that the IDEA regulations do mention “good faith,” but argues that a “good 
faith effort” standard is ill-founded.  Id.  Specifically, the regulations mandate that services 
be provided in accordance with the IEP and that a “good faith effort” be made to help the 
child meet his IEP objectives.  Id.  Therefore, in the court’s opinion, the regulations plainly 
demonstrated that these are two separate requirements that cannot be merged and 
encompassed by a “good faith effort” standard.  Id.  The regulations require as follows, in 
pertinent part: 
 (a)  Provision of services.  Subject to paragraph (b) of this section, 
each public agency must— 
 (1)  Provide special education and related services to a child with a 
disability in accordance with the child’s IEP; and 
 (2)  Make a good faith effort to assist the child to achieve the goals 
and objectives or benchmarks listed in the IEP. 
34 C.F.R. § 300.350 (2000) (emphasis added). 
137 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006) (discussing the IDEA’s goals). 
138 See infra Part III.C (analyzing the Ninth Circuit’s standard for evaluating IEP 
implementation failures). 
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C. The Van Duyn Standard Materially Fails to Educate Children with 
Disabilities 
The Ninth Circuit’s approach to evaluating IEP implementation 
failures further contradicts the purpose of the IDEA.139  In Van Duyn, 
after looking to both the text of the IDEA and the decisions of other 
courts, the Ninth Circuit held that a school district does not violate the 
IDEA when it fails to perform exactly as called for by the IEP, unless its 
failure was material.140  “A material failure occurs when there is more 
than a minor discrepancy between the services a school provides to a 
disabled child and the services required by the child’s IEP.”141  
Moreover, the materiality standard “does not require that the [student] 
suffer demonstrable educational harm in order to prevail.  However, the 
[student’s] educational progress, or lack of it, may be probative of 
whether there has been more than a minor shortfall in the services 
provided.”142 
Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit’s standard does not focus 
on the importance of the provision within the IEP and instead applies a 
more rigorous de minimis standard.143  The Ninth Circuit’s standard 
strikes a better balance between deference to educational authorities and 
maintaining protections for students with disabilities as required by the 
                                                 
139 See supra note 124 (discussing Congress’s purpose and intent in drafting the IDEA). 
140 Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2007).  Specifically, the Van 
Duyn court looked to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Bobby R. where the court addressed the 
issue of IEP implementation failure and holding that  
to prevail on a claim under the IDEA, a party challenging the 
implementation of an IEP must show more than a de minimis failure to 
implement all the elements of that IEP, and, instead, must demonstrate 
that the school board or other authorities failed to implement 
substantial or significant provisions of the IEP. 
Id. at 821 (quoting Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 2000)).  
The court then analyzed the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Clark, which held that the IDEA is 
violated “if there is evidence that the school actually failed to implement an essential 
element of the IEP that was necessary for the child to receive an educational benefit.”  Id. at 
822 (quoting Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1027 (8th Cir. 2002)). 
141 Id.  To illustrate, the court stated that if a child is not provided the reading instruction 
called for, and there is a shortfall in the child’s reading achievement, that would certainly 
tend to show that the failure to implement the IEP was material.  Id. 
142 Id. 
143 King, supra note 63, at 476; see also Termine v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 
249 F. App’x 583, 586 (9th Cir. 2007) (providing an example of a more rigorous de minimis 
standard).  In Termine, the court found that a denial of FAPE is a material failure to 
implement a student’s existing IEP when the school proposed an interim placement for the 
student in general education thirty-two percent of the time, despite the fact that the 
student’s IEP provided that the student spend no time in general education.  Id. 
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IDEA.144  Additionally, by not requiring that the child suffer 
demonstrable educational harm in order to prevail, the materiality 
standard shifts the focus towards the nature of the failure itself, rather 
than the student’s educational performance.145  Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s 
standard requires school districts to comply with the agreed-upon IEP 
provisions and holds school districts accountable for their failure to do 
so.146 
Although the Ninth Circuit’s materiality standard provides a better 
approach to examining IEP implementation failures than the Fifth 
Circuit, the Ninth Circuit’s standard is not without flaws as it also raises 
several concerns.147  First, the Ninth Circuit misinterpreted the text of the 
IDEA.148  For example, to determine the standard for assessing an IEP's 
implementation, the court looked to the text of the IDEA, which defines a 
free appropriate public education as “special education and related 
services that . . . are provided in conformity with the [child’s] 
individualized education program.”149  The court interpreted the “in 
conformity with” language as counseling “against making minor 
                                                 
144 See King, supra note 63, at 483 (arguing that the materiality standard used by the Van 
Duyn court is an important legal development and creates a better balance between the 
deference given to school districts and maintaining protections for students with 
disabilities).  Moreover, the most significant legal shift is the court’s explicit language 
regarding examining the student’s educational benefit.  Id.  But see Reed, supra note 86, at 
499 (discussing how the Van Duyn standard diminished the educational rights of disabled 
children). 
145 See Ferster, supra note 47, at 29.  Ferster continues on by stating that 
[w]hile the Fifth Circuit’s standard suggests a school offers a FAPE 
despite an implementation failure as long as the implemented portions 
of the IEP convey an educational benefit, the Ninth Circuit appears to 
find a denial of FAPE wherever the implementation failure in and of 
itself constitutes a “significant shortfall in services provided,” even if 
the IEP, as implemented, would otherwise meet the Rowley standard. 
Id. 
146 Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 822.  The court stressed that nothing in the opinion is intended 
to weaken schools’ obligations to provide services in conformity with students’ IEPs.  Id.  
IEPs are clearly binding under the IDEA, and the proper course for a school district that 
wishes to make material changes to an IEP is to reconvene the IEP team pursuant to the 
statute—not to decide on its own no longer to implement part or all of the IEP.  Id. 
147 See supra notes 101–04 (introducing criticisms of the Ninth Circuit’s materiality 
standard which argue that it is an incorrect standard for assessing IEP implementation 
failures). 
148 See Reed, supra note 86, at 499 (noting that the majority’s conclusion regarding the 
meaning of “‘in conformity with’ somehow ‘counsel[ing] against making minor 
implementation failures actionable’ is unsupported by the text of the IDEA and incorrect 
based on the plain meaning of the word ‘conformity.’”  Id.; see also King, supra note 63, at 
481 (“One commentator argues that the ‘in conformity with’ clause of Section 1401(9)(D) 
‘does not suggest flexibility . . . but rather its definition connotes strict compliance.’”). 
149 See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2000). 
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implementation failures actionable.”150  Based upon this reading, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that the statute did not require perfect 
adherence to an IEP, nor did it require a court to find that minor 
implementation failures were a denial of a FAPE.151 
The majority’s interpretation of the “in conformity” language in the 
IDEA is unsupported by the text of the IDEA.  The language “in 
conformity with” and the use of the phrase “in accordance with the 
child’s IEP” in the federal regulations do not suggest flexibility as the 
majority advocates, but rather its definition requires strict compliance.152  
Therefore, the dissent was correct when it concluded that a failure to 
implement any portion of an IEP is not “in conformity with” the IEP as 
required by the statutory text, thus making it a denial of a FAPE and a 
violation of the IDEA.153 
Second, the majority improperly relied on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Rowley in its evaluation of IEP implementation failures.154  
The Van Duyn majority found that the Supreme Court’s description in 
Rowley of the IDEA’s purpose, as “providing a ‘basic floor of 
opportunity’ to disabled students rather than a ‘potential maximizing 
                                                 
150 Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 821. 
151 Id. 
152 See Reed, supra note 86, at 499.  “The majority's finding that ‘in conformity with’ 
somehow ‘counsels against making minor implementation failures actionable’ is 
unsupported by the text of the IDEA and incorrect based on the plain meaning of the word 
‘conformity.’”  Id.; see also Ferster, supra note 47 (describing the ambiguity in the FAPE 
definition calling for services to be provided “in conformity with” an IEP).  “Conformity” is 
defined as “correspondence in form, manner, or character” or “agreement.”  Conformity 
Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
conformity (last visited Dec. 23, 2010).  But see King, supra note 63, at 481 (discussing the 
Van Duyn court’s interpretation of the phrase “in conformity with”).  “To surmount this 
criticism, the court’s textual argument would have been stronger had it defined the word 
‘conformity.’  For example, several dictionaries define ‘conformity’ as ‘similarity’ and 
‘likeness.’  These words do not imply ‘exact’ or ‘perfect’ adherence.”  Id. 
153 See Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 827 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (“A school district’s failure to 
comply with the specific measures in an IEP to which it has assented is, by definition, a 
denial of FAPE, and hence, a violation of the IDEA.”); see also Reed, supra note 86, at 499 
(arguing that a failure to implement any portion of an IEP is not “in conformity with” the 
IEP as required by the IDEA and a direct violation of the IDEA). 
154 See King, supra note 63, at 481.  The majority substantially relied on Rowley and 
applied its “appropriate education” holding to the context of IEP implementation 
challenges, despite the fact that Rowley dealt with a challenge to an IEP’s content and not its 
implementation.  Id.  The majority cited and rejected the standards used in Bobby R. and 
Clark, but did not discuss why it chose not to adopt the standards used by these courts.  Id. 
at 482.  Moreover, the majority’s analysis is incomplete because it omitted the standards 
employed by other courts, such as the Melissa S. standard that examines the school 
district’s reason for the implementation failure.  Id. at 483; see supra note 24 (discussing the 
due process safeguards of the IDEA); supra note 40 (discussing parental involvement in the 
IEP process and the IDEA’s due process safeguards). 
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education’ also support[ed] granting some flexibility to school districts 
charged with implementing IEPs.”155  While the Rowley court held that 
an IEP’s content must only confer “‘some’ educational benefit upon the 
disabled child,” the majority in Van Duyn incorrectly interpreted this as 
granting “flexibility” to school districts charged with implementing 
IEPs.156  Allowing this flexibility regarding IEP content and 
implementation undermines the very reason Congress created the IDEA 
and further diminishes the only educational rights disabled children 
have—the rights granted to them by the IDEA.157 
Third, just like the Fifth Circuit’s standard, the Ninth Circuit’s 
materiality standard is inconsistent with the mandates of the IDEA 
because it allows the judiciary to completely disregard the IEP teams’ 
determinations and substitute its own notions of educational policy.158  
The IDEA confers upon IEP teams the responsibility of addressing 
matters such as the child’s present level of academic achievement, 
annual goals for the child, how progress toward those goals is to be 
measured, and the services to be provided to the child.159  Therefore, 
judges are not in a position to determine which parts of an IEP are or are 
not material.160  Rather than focusing on how material a failure is, courts 
should assume that an IEP team settled on specific educational services 
for a reason, especially because each IEP team chooses certain services 
for the purpose of providing the student with a FAPE.161  “If the IEP 
                                                 
155 Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 821. 
156 Reed, supra note 86, at 499; see also, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189, 215 
(1982) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the IDEA announced an intent to provide a full 
educational opportunity to all handicapped children and that Congress intended the IDEA 
to identify and evaluate handicapped children and provide them with an equal 
opportunity to learn).  The IDEA intended to provide a basic floor of opportunity to 
eliminate the effects of a handicap, at least to the extent that the child will be given an equal 
and reasonably possible opportunity to learn.  Id.  Justice White further argues that despite 
the majority’s reliance on the use of “appropriate” in the definition of the IDEA, the 
majority’s decision falls short of what the IDEA intended.  Id. at 215–18. 
157 See supra note 124 (discussing Congress’s intent in drafting the IDEA). 
158 See Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 826; see also supra note 40 (discussing the role of IEP teams 
and the procedural safeguards created by Congress to prevent unilateral amendments to 
IEPs). 
159 See 20 U.S.C § 1414(d)(1)(A) (2006) (discussing the implementation of IEPs); see also 
supra note 37 (providing a description of the IEP). 
160 See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206–07, 216 (1982) (stating that the role of the judiciary is, first, 
to determine whether the state has complied with the IDEA’s procedural safeguards, and 
second, to determine whether the IEP is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive 
educational benefits); see also Bagenstos, supra note 99, at 122–26 (discussing the judiciary’s 
role in special education litigation under the IDEA). 
161 See Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 827–28 (Ferguson, J, dissenting); Jean B. Crockett & Mitchell 
Yell, Without Data All We Have Are Assumptions:  Revisiting the Meaning of a Free Appropriate 
Public Education, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 381, 388 (2008) (noting that the IDEA directs IEP teams, 
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team had thought another, lesser service would be sufficient to provide 
FAPE, it would have included that service in the IEP.”162  Enabling 
school districts to disregard portions of the IEP that the IEP team has 
already agreed upon would essentially give them a license to single-
handedly change the content of the IEP and disregard both the IEP and 
the parental participation provisions of the IDEA.163 
Finally, the materiality standard, like the Fifth Circuit’s standard for 
evaluating IEP implementation failures, is vague.164  The Ninth Circuit 
held that a material failure occurs when there is more than a minor 
discrepancy between the services provided to a disabled child and those 
required by the IEP.165  The majority, however, provided little guidance 
as to what constituted a minor discrepancy.166  To illustrate the lack of 
clarity, Judge Ferguson stated, “If an IEP requires ten hours per week of 
math tutoring, would the provision of only nine hours be ‘more than a 
minor discrepancy’?  Eight hours?  Seven hours?”167  Therefore, because 
most IEPs contain quantitative requirements for special education 
services, the Ninth Circuit’s materiality standard is flawed because it 
provides little guidance in resolving implementation issues.168 
In summary, the Ninth Circuit in Van Duyn determined the incorrect 
standard for assessing IEP implementation failures by holding that only 
                                                                                                             
when developing a student’s IEP, to base the special education services to be provided on 
reliable evidence that the program or service works); Reed, supra note 86, at 500 (arguing 
that IEP teams design the IEP to provide a specific student with a FAPE, thus any 
subsequent deviation from the IEP is necessarily material and a violation of the IDEA). 
162 See Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 828 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (recognizing that IEP teams are 
in the best position to determine the services required to provide the student with an 
appropriate education). 
163 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d)(3)(A)(ii) (requiring an IEP team to consider parental concerns 
in the development of an IEP for their child); Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 828 (Ferguson, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the IEP team chooses specific services with specific quantities and 
durations for the purpose of providing the student with a FAPE, thus allowing school 
districts to ignore the IEP provisions grants them authority to redefine the content of the 
student’s plan by default); see also supra note 24 (discussing the IDEA’s due process 
safeguard); supra note 40 (discussing due process and parental involvement in the IEP 
process). 
164 See Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 828 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (explaining that the materiality 
standard adopted by the majority does not provide an explanation of what constitutes a 
minor discrepancy and provides little guidance in resolving IEP implementation failures). 
165 Id. at 822; see also supra Part II.D.3 (discussing the Van Duyn materiality standard). 
166 Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 828 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Van Duyn 
materiality standard does not provide an appropriate way of determining when there is 
more than a minor discrepancy between the services provided to a disabled child and those 
required by the IEP). 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 827–28. 
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material failures to implement IEPs violate the IDEA.169  Similarly, the 
Third and Fifth Circuits have also adopted standards that undermine the 
purpose of the IDEA and further diminish the educational rights of 
disabled children.170  Instead, the circuit courts should have found, as the 
dissent in Van Duyn and the Manalansan court did, that failure to 
implement any portion of an IEP violates the IDEA.171 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
The IDEA requires school districts receiving federal funding to 
provide disabled students with a FAPE.172  An IEP is critical to this 
requirement because it establishes the special education and related 
services that will be provided to each disabled student.173  The standards 
adopted by the circuits illustrate that there is an inherent difficulty in 
evaluating whether a school district’s failure to implement provisions in 
an IEP constitutes a deprivation of a FAPE, in violation of the IDEA.174  
To promote consistency and to fully accomplish the goal of educating 
students with disabilities, the IDEA should mandate that school districts 
strictly adhere to all provisions of a student’s IEP.175  Accordingly, Part 
IV proposes two alternatives to accomplish this:  (1) adding strict 
compliance to the existing definition of a FAPE in the IDEA, or (2) 
adopting a uniform standard for evaluating IEP implementation failures. 
A. Proposed Amendment to the IDEA  
The lack of clarity in the IDEA regarding the amount of compliance 
with a student’s IEP that a school district must provide to satisfy the 
FAPE requirement has created differing interpretations among the 
courts.176  This approach would resolve the disparity in interpretation 
                                                 
169 See supra Part III.C (discussing the Van Duyn materiality standard). 
170 See supra Part II.B (discussing the goals and rights granted to children with disabilities 
by the IDEA). 
171 See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text (discussing the Manalansan court’s view 
rejecting the use of the “good faith effort” defense for IEP implementation failures and 
interpreting the IDEA as mandating that all services enumerated in an IEP be provided); see 
also supra notes 99–104 and accompanying text (discussing the Van Duyn dissent’s view as 
requiring strict compliance with an IEP). 
172 See supra Part II.B (discussing the protections provided to children with disabilities 
under the IDEA). 
173 See supra note 61 (discussing the IEP). 
174 See supra Part II.D (discussing the standards used by the courts to evaluate a school 
district’s failure to implement a student’s IEP). 
175 See infra Part IV (discussing two options for evaluating IEP implementation failures). 
176 See supra Part II.B (introducing the IDEA and discussing that Congress never clarified 
the definition of FAPE in the IDEA’s subsequent reauthorizations). 
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and the inconsistencies surrounding IEP implementation failures.  The 
IDEA’s definition of a FAPE with proposed language requiring school 
districts to strictly adhere with all provisions of a disabled student’s IEP 
is as follows: 
The term “free appropriate public education” means special 
education and related services that— 
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public 
supervision and direction, and without charge; 
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency; 
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, 
or secondary school education in the State involved; and 
(D) are provided in strict compliance conformity with the 
individualized educational program  required under 
section 1414(d) of this title.177 
Commentary 
This approach, which is most consistent with the congressional 
intent of the IDEA, provides students with disabilities an individualized 
and appropriate education while also balancing school districts’ interest 
in preserving their limited resources.178  The IDEA was not intended to 
maximize the potential of each handicapped child, but rather designed to 
meet the unique needs of handicapped students and to provide services 
that will permit them to benefit from the instruction.179  The IEP teams 
carefully draft IEPs to include the services that best suit the educational 
needs of each individual child.180  Therefore, requiring school districts to 
strictly adhere to a student’s IEP ensures that students with disabilities 
are provided an appropriate education. 
Moreover, requiring school districts to strictly adhere to all of the 
provisions of an IEP does not impose a heavy burden on school districts.  
This is because school districts are free to amend a student’s IEP through 
the required channels if they determine that portions of the program are 
                                                 
177 Italics indicate the Notewriter’s proposed language improving the IDEA definition of 
FAPE. 
178 See supra Part II.B (discussing the IDEA’s goal of ensuring that all handicapped 
children have available to them a FAPE). 
179 See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189, 203–04 (1982) (finding that the IDEA 
does not require that schools maximize the child’s educational potential, but it must 
provide an education that is specifically designed to meet the child’s unique needs, 
supported by services that will permit him to benefit from the instruction). 
180 See Rosenblum, supra note 15, at 2739 (discussing the role of IEP teams). 
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not essential to providing a FAPE.181  Because school administrators are 
actively involved in the IEP process, including the selection of the 
services and accommodations to be provided, they typically include only 
those services that the school is capable and willing to provide.182  The 
IDEA does not require school districts to satisfy all parents’ requests for 
services as long as the school offers a FAPE.183  Thus, school districts 
retain a significant amount of control over the allocation of their 
resources.  Furthermore, once a school district evaluates the services it 
believes are required to provide the student with a FAPE and 
incorporates those services into the student’s IEP, it is bound by its 
agreement.184 
Likewise, if the parents of a disabled child feel that the services and 
accommodations provided in the IEP are not sufficient to provide their 
child with a FAPE, they can also amend the student’s IEP through the 
required channels.185  For example, the IDEA’s safeguards allow the 
parents to challenge a school district in an impartial hearing before a 
state administrative hearing officer when parents believe their child’s 
rights have been violated.186  Thus, the proposed amendment requiring 
school districts to strictly comply with all provisions of an agreed-upon 
IEP would not impose a heavy burden on either party. 
The proposed amendment is also consistent with the congressional 
intent of the IDEA.  To illustrate, the stated purpose of the IDEA is no 
longer just to ensure educational access, but rather “to assess, and ensure 
the effectiveness of, efforts to educate children with disabilities.”187  
Adding the proposed language would effectively provide guidance to 
the courts and school districts as to the amount of compliance with a 
student’s IEP that a school district must provide to satisfy the FAPE 
requirement.  It would also absolve the problem of courts applying 
different standards to evaluate IEP implementation failures.188  This is 
                                                 
181 See supra note 128 (discussing the procedures that both school districts and parents 
must follow in order to modify an IEP). 
182 See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text (discussing the individuals involved in 
the drafting of the IEP). 
183 See supra Part II.B–C (discussing the IDEA’s FAPE requirement and the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of that requirement). 
184 See supra note 102 (stating in dissent that once all parties have agreed that the content 
of the IEP provides a FAPE, the school district must provide the services). 
185 See supra note 128 (discussing the procedures that both school districts and parents 
must follow in order to modify an IEP). 
186 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)–(2) (2006); see also supra note 40 (discussing the rights of 
parents under the IDEA to challenge the IEP). 
187 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(4). 
188 See supra Part III (discussing how the various standards used by the circuit courts have 
led to different results for similarly situated disabled students across the nation). 
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the desired outcome because there is currently no uniform method of 
assessing school districts’ failure to comply with the mandates of the 
IDEA.  Thus, requiring strict compliance with an IEP would ensure that 
children with disabilities receive an appropriate education.189  The 
proposed amendment to the IDEA, however, is not the only option 
available to resolve the current problem of assessing IEP implementation 
failures.190 
B. Uniform Standard for Evaluating IEP Implementation Failures 
Adopting a uniform standard for evaluating IEP implementation 
failures is another viable method for resolving the current disparity in 
interpretations among the circuit courts.  Under this approach, school 
districts would be required to strictly comply with all provisions in a 
student’s IEP.  An ideal standard, modeled after the Van Duyn dissent 
and the Manalansan court, for evaluating IEP implementation failures 
would state the following: 
The failure to implement any portion of a student’s IEP to 
which the school has assented is a denial of FAPE per se and 
hence, a violation of the IDEA.191 
The proposed standard addresses the following considerations:  
(1) congressional intent; (2) judicial inappropriateness; and (3) the 
burden on school districts. 
First, this standard fits squarely within congressional intent and is 
therefore a more appropriate approach to evaluating IEP implementation 
failures.192  Congress specifically delegated to IEP teams the task of 
determining the required services that are necessary for the student to 
receive a FAPE.193  An IEP is the product of an extensive process and 
represents the reasoned conclusion of the IEP team that specific 
measures are necessary for the student to receive an educational 
benefit.194  Therefore, a school district’s failure to fully comply with these 
                                                 
189 See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text (discussing the Manalansan opinion); 
supra notes 99–104 and accompanying text (discussing the Van Duyn dissent in support of 
this standard). 
190 See infra Part IV.B (discussing the use of a uniform standard for evaluating IEP 
implementation failures). 
191 This proposed standard was adapted from the opinions of the Van Duyn dissent and 
Manalansan court. 
192 See supra note 124 (discussing the congressional intent of the IDEA). 
193 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (2006) (defining an IEP team). 
194 See supra note 107 (discussing the role of the IEP in fulfilling the IDEA’s FAPE 
requirement). 
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specific services is a denial of FAPE.195  Requiring that school districts 
fully implement all services in an IEP ensures the effectiveness of efforts 
to educate disabled students, as required by the IDEA.196  Furthermore, 
this standard would rectify the problem of school districts failing to 
provide disabled students with the supplemental and assistive services 
to which they are legally entitled. 
Second, this standard appropriately addresses the issue of judges 
interpreting the materiality or significance of an IEP.197  The Van Duyn 
dissent and Manalansan court found that such determinations are 
inappropriate for the judiciary.198  Specifically, the Van Duyn dissent 
stated that judges were not in a position to determine which parts of an 
IEP are or are not material to the student’s education.199  This standard 
rectifies the problem of judges disregarding the IEP teams’ 
determinations and substituting their own notions of educational 
policy.200  Under this standard, the courts would no longer focus on the 
materiality or significance of an IEP’s provisions, but rather on the school 
district’s compliance with the required services and accommodations 
enumerated in the IEP.  Furthermore, a uniform standard ensures that 
the educational needs of students with disabilities are fully met. 
Third, this standard adequately addresses the interests of school 
districts and children with disabilities.  As previously discussed, school 
districts and parents of children with disabilities can modify the IEP 
through established procedures if they determine that the IEP is no 
longer appropriate.201  Thus, requiring strict compliance with an IEP 
would not impose an excessive burden on any one party because the 
option to modify the IEP preserves a great deal of flexibility.  More 
importantly, neither this standard nor the IDEA requires school districts 
to adhere to every demand presented by the parents of the disabled 
                                                 
195 See supra note 99 (discussing the Van Duyn dissent’s view that the failure to implement 
any portion of a student’s IEP is a violation of the IDEA); see also Reed, supra note 86, at 499 
(arguing that a failure to implement any portion of an IEP is not “in conformity with” the 
IEP as required by the IDEA and a direct violation of the IDEA). 
196 See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(d)(4). 
197 See supra Part II.D.1, 3 (discussing the ‘significant provision’ standard used by the 
Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit’s ‘material failures’ standard). 
198 See supra notes 99–104 and accompanying text (discussing the dissent in Van Duyn’s 
reasoning for rejecting the significant provision and materiality standards). 
199 Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 827 (9th Cir. 2007) (Ferguson, J., 
dissenting).  Rather, the dissent asserts that IEP teams are in the best position to determine 
the needs of special education students.  Id. 
200 See supra note 99 (discussing judiciary’s role in special education). 
201 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)–(2); see also supra note 40 (discussing the rights of parents 
under the IDEA to challenge the IEP). 
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child.202  It simply requires school districts to meet the agreed-upon 
provisions in the IEP and holds them accountable for their failure to 
abide by the agreement. 
In sum, the proposed alternatives provide a clear and consistent 
method for evaluating a school district’s failure to implement a student’s 
IEP.  Additionally, they promote the IDEA’s goal of educating children 
with disabilities while balancing the interests of school districts and 
students. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Throughout history, children with disabilities were routinely 
excluded from public schools and denied the educational opportunities 
available to children without mental or physical disabilities.  The IDEA 
has made substantial progress over the last few decades to alleviate this 
severe discrepancy in educational opportunities.  Congress’s failure to 
clarify the definition of FAPE in the IDEA, however, has left the courts 
with the difficult task of interpreting the amount of compliance with a 
student’s IEP that is required to adequately provide the child with a 
FAPE.  The different standards developed by the circuits to evaluate IEP 
implementation failures have resulted in a significant departure from the 
IDEA’s goal of ensuring the effectiveness of efforts to educate children 
with disabilities. 
To resolve the current struggle among the circuits, Part IV proposed 
that strict compliance be added to the definition of a FAPE in the IDEA 
or that courts adopt a uniform standard requiring strict compliance with 
a student’s IEP.  The proposed methods promote uniformity and provide 
a clear and consistent way of evaluating IEP implementation failures.  
Furthermore, the adoption of either approach would also guarantee that 
students receive the educational services and accommodations that best 
cater to their needs.  Thus, under this approach, Robert is entitled to the 
services enumerated in his IEP and the school district is accountable for 
its failure to provide such services.  Only then will the IDEA truly 
provide children with disabilities equal access to a public education. 
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